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ABSTRACT 
ILA HUGHES BROYLES: Community versus Facility Long-Term Care: Impacts on Medicare 
Spending and Service Use 
(Under the direction of Morris Weinberger) 
Older Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities are a high-cost Medicare population and use 
substantial amounts of health care. A distinctive feature of this population is their use of long-term 
care (LTC), which can be provided in a facility (e.g., nursing facility, assisted living facility) or the 
community. This dissertation examined the effect of facility LTC versus community LTC on Medicare 
expenditures and service use among fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries from 2000-2009.  
I examined facility LTC’s effect on: Medicare expenditures for inpatient and physician 
services (Aim 1); Medicare expenditures for sub-acute services (skilled nursing facility, home health, 
and hospice) (Aim 2); and emergency department (ED) visits, observation days, and likelihood of 30-
day or 60-day hospital readmission (Aim 3). To illuminate the role of competing mortality, I 
implemented most models as survival-adjusted models. To account for potential unobservable 
differences among those who used community versus facility LTC, I used an instrumental variables 
approach in all models. The primary dataset for the dissertation was the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey, supplemented with public data on LTC supply.  
Incident facility LTC users had substantially lower adjusted cumulative survival. In Aim 1, this 
higher mortality for facility LTC users decreased cumulative Medicare expenditures on both inpatient 
and physician services, because individuals were progressively less likely to survive and use 
services. However, non-significant effects on intensity of service when individuals were alive yielded a 
non-significant total effect on each expenditure type. In Aim 2, higher mortality again decreased 
expenditures. However, facility LTC increased intensity of sub-acute service use when alive. The 
combined effects translated to significantly higher sub-acute expenditures for facility LTC users in 
early months, though the countervailing effects resulted in a non-significant total effect in later 
months. In Aim 3, facility LTC increased counts of ED visits, largely due to differences in service 
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intensity when alive. Facility LTC had a non-significant effect on likelihood of 30-day or 60-day 
readmission. Together, this dissertation suggests LTC facilities affect residents’ healthcare use. 
Payment and benefit design should seek to reward the integration of LTC and healthcare delivery into 
more appropriate and efficient use of Medicare-covered services for vulnerable older adults. 
 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This work was possible only due to the encouragement, guidance, and commitment of a 
cadre of individuals as well as generous funders.  
I must begin by thanking my dissertation committee: Morris Weinberger, Mark Holmes, 
Courtney Van Houtven, Phil Sloane, and Kristin Reiter. Each of them brought their own lens and 
offered insights, solutions, and encouragement that helped me push the work forward and make each 
draft better. Additionally, I must thank Jeff Federspiel, who served as a consultant on this project. I 
owe him a debt for both his help with obtaining the data as well as introducing me to and helping me 
with the methodology I use here. This dissertation benefitted from his generosity of time and expertise 
immensely.  
I want to particularly thank my advisor, Morris Weinberger, for his unflagging commitment to 
students’ success. He is a great champion and encourager of young researchers, in addition to an 
outstanding scientist himself. He not only improved my dissertation but also my quality of life. I chose 
UNC’s PhD program because of Morris’s obvious commitment to the PhD students as program 
director. As an advisor and mentor, he exceeded all expectations in his investment in and 
encouragement of me as a researcher and mentee. 
I also want to thank Mark Holmes for his perseverance and creativity in the midst of the 
methodological challenges I faced. Mark was available and willing to help me find solutions for 
complex questions, and I would not have been able to execute this project without his good-natured, 
solutions-oriented problem solving.  
I benefitted from Courtney Van Houtven, Phil Sloane, and Kristin Reiter not only in my 
dissertation work, where they each offered great insight, questions, prodding, and affirmation, but 
outside my dissertation work as well. Each of these scientists was generous enough to engage me 
with other projects, providing opportunities to stretch myself as a young researcher. These projects 
often helped me improve as a researcher and writer in ways that doubtlessly influenced the 
vi 
dissertation work here. Additionally, they engaged me personally, and I gained valuable advice and 
mentorship from each of them. 
 I am grateful for the encouragement and help of friends I have found through UNC, 
particularly in my cohort. I appreciated their encouragement, accountability, and friendship and look 
forward to lifelong friendships with many of them. 
Finally, I want to thank my family. In particular, I want to thank my husband Jim Broyles. He 
has championed me from the outset to the finish line: moving with me to UNC so I could pursue my 
PhD, supporting me through coursework, walking alongside me through the inevitable challenges that 
a dissertation brings. His optimism was a buoy to me at the end of every day, and I am thankful to 
celebrate this accomplishment with him—it’s as much his as it is mine. 
I am grateful to generous funding for this research. This project was generously supported by 
grant number R36HS022794 from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and NIA 
5T32AG000272—UNC-CH Institute on Aging Carolina Program in Health and Aging Research Pre-
Doctoral Traineeship. Additionally, I wish to acknowledge partial support for MCBS acquisition from 
the UNC Institute on Aging Pilot Grant UL1-TR000083, F30-HL110483, and T32-GM008719. The 
protected time afforded me by the AHRQ and NIA fellowships enabled me not only to complete the 
dissertation but also provided me with unique training and presentation opportunities. I also 
appreciated the feedback I received through the CPHAR program and my fellow trainees. 
 
vii 
PREFACE 
This dissertation is organized in a non-traditional format. The first chapter provides a brief 
introduction to the topic and the specific aims of the dissertation. Chapter 2 provides a literature 
review and a conceptual model for the study. Chapter 3 includes an overview of the approach taken 
in each study aim. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are manuscripts for the three study aims, intended to stand 
alone as publishable manuscripts and thus have redundancies with other chapters. Chapter 7 
provides a summary of findings and policy implications and suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Increasing healthcare expenditures are threatening Medicare solvency and driving the U.S. 
healthcare crisis. Disabled older adults are among those Medicare beneficiaries with the highest 
healthcare costs.1,2 In addition to substantial healthcare needs, disabled older adults often require 
long-term care (LTC). LTC provides help with daily activities (e.g., bathing, eating) and can be 
delivered in a facility such as nursing facilities (NF) and assisted living facilities (ALFs) (“facility LTC”) 
or in community settings like one’s own home (“community LTC”).  
Though Medicare does not pay for LTC, facility LTC providers have large influence on 
residents’ healthcare use and face financial incentives to increase residents’ Medicare-covered 
healthcare use. Prior research suggested that facility LTC did not increase healthcare service use,3 
however the financial environment for LTC facilities has shifted dramatically since this research was 
conducted. Changes over the past twenty years (1990 and after) developed or amplified incentives 
for LTC facilities to increase healthcare use. Incentives include diminished liability (if they recommend 
the most aggressive treatment), decreased costs of providing care (if residents are in the hospital), 
and the prospect of higher margins (if patients receive Medicare-covered rehabilitation services 
provided by the facility).  
1.2. Study Purpose and Specific Aims 
The overall objective of this research was to identify whether facility LTC affects Medicare 
expenditures and healthcare outcomes. My central hypothesis was that facility LTC increased use of 
Medicare-covered service, relative to community LTC, due to financial incentives and increased 
access to providers. I tested my central hypothesis by pursuing the following three specific aims:  
Aim 1 To identify whether facility LTC affects Medicare expenditures for acute 
care and physician/practitioner services (e.g., nurse practitioner, etc.) 
among disabled older adults. 
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Hypothesis 1 Facility LTC will result in higher Medicare expenditures for acute care but 
not of physician/practitioner services relative to community LTC. 
Aim 2 To identify whether facility LTC affects Medicare expenditures for sub-
acute care (skilled nursing facility, home health, and hospice) among 
disabled older adults. 
Hypothesis 2 Facility LTC will result in higher Medicare expenditures for sub-acute care 
relative to community LTC.  
Aim 3 To determine whether facility LTC and its associated healthcare use result 
in potentially avoidable health services utilization, specifically emergency 
department (ED) visits, hospital observation days, and re-hospitalizations.  
Hypothesis 3 Facility LTC will result in more potentially avoidable healthcare use relative 
to community LTC. 
 
1.3. Study Significance 
This study was significant because it sought to determine the effect of a policy-modifiable 
factor, LTC setting, on healthcare expenditures for high-cost Medicare beneficiaries. The identification 
of modifiable factors that can reduce Medicare expenditures and improve program efficiency is 
immediately relevant to policymakers and providers. Currently, policymakers are experimenting with 
new payment mechanisms in Medicare. This research could illuminate how and whether LTC settings 
may be affecting healthcare costs. This understanding could be incorporated into current and future 
payment mechanisms that incentivize LTC providers to help bend the Medicare cost-curve. 
Additionally, ongoing work to “re-balance” Medicaid spending on LTC toward more community LTC 
could receive more attention if policymakers see potential savings to Medicare as a by-product of 
such efforts.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
2.1. Disability, LTC, and Medicare Costs among the Elderly 
Identifying the causes of high healthcare costs has become a major research priority as 
concerns about U.S. healthcare spending, particularly in Medicare, continue to grow.4,5 Cost-
containment interventions that focus on the highest cost beneficiaries have the potential to achieve 
the greatest savings.6 This has led to investment of researcher time and focus, as well as federal 
research funding, on patients with multi-morbidity and/or transitional care between settings.7 
Unfortunately, though they may improve care delivery or patient experience, neither care 
management for patients with multi-morbidity nor efforts to improve transitional care have consistently 
achieved Medicare cost savings among high-cost beneficiaries.8,9,10 Thus, clear solutions for 
stemming cost growth among high-cost populations remains a stubborn problem. 
Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities are among the highest cost beneficiaries, even after 
adjusting for comorbidity.11,12,13,14 Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions and disabilities have 
higher spending than individuals with chronic conditions only, regardless of the number of multi-
morbidities.15 A distinctive feature of this population, as compared to other high-cost healthcare users, 
is their use of long-term care (LTC). Disabled beneficiaries often need LTC, which can be provided in 
a facility such as a nursing facility (NF) or assisted living facility (ALF) or in the community, from paid 
or unpaid caregivers. In addition to having disabilities that require LTC, the costliest Medicare 
beneficiaries are disproportionately likely to receive facility LTC.16 However, Medicare does not cover 
LTC that provides ongoing help with disabilities, regardless of the setting. As a result, once multi-
morbidity is controlled, there is no clear medical reason that disabilities and associated use of LTC 
should increase Medicare expenditures.  
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2.2. Previous Research on LTC and Medicare Costs  
Much previous research on the role of LTC in Medicare costs has been hindered by 
methodological challenges. Facility LTC users likely have higher rates of chronic disease and medical 
complexity compared to other disabled individuals.17 Without considering selection effects, 
researchers may have trouble distinguishing the effects of facility LTC from multi-morbidity, for 
example, and inadvertently attribute the costs due to chronic disease to the receipt of facility LTC. No 
recent studies have identified how LTC setting (facility versus community) affects Medicare 
expenditures while adequately considering the selection effects involved in LTC setting. Some 
investigators used LTC setting as a proxy for disability level without adjusting for the unobserved 
characteristics that may influence LTC setting. A previous study on the effects of disability on 1993 
Medicare expenditures used facility LTC residence as a proxy for high level of disability,18 however 
this work did not explicitly consider selection effects and used Medicare expenditures prior to the 
imposition of the skilled nursing facility prospective payment system. Guralnik and colleagues 
examined transitions to higher levels of disability and found that high healthcare costs were 
associated with transitions to facility-based LTC without considering selection effects.19  
Previous studies that sought to address selection effects involved in LTC setting are either 
dated, struggled to find adequate control groups, or limited the type of LTC services they examined. 
The many experimental demonstrations that examined the cost-effectiveness of community LTC 
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s and found that community-based LTC did not reduce 
healthcare costs.20 However, these occurred when Medicare payment dynamics, particularly for 
nursing facilities, were very different. The most notable of these, the Channeling Demonstration—a 
national demonstration to delay nursing home admission that finished in 1985—found that delaying 
nursing home admission did not reduce healthcare expenditures, possibly because researchers could 
not identify and enroll patients at risk for nursing home admission as a control group.21 Other work 
that explicitly sought to control for selection effects examined only one type of community LTC. Van 
Houtven and Edwards found that receipt of informal care, a type of LTC typically provided in the 
community, reduced acute and sub-acute Medicare expenditures for beneficiaries in 1993 and 
1995.22  
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2.3. Changing Financial Environment for Facility LTC Providers 
In the past two decades (the time elapsed since the last major experimental research on 
LTC’s effect on Medicare costs) the financial environment for facility LTC providers has changed 
substantially. First, the payment dynamics for NFs changed. The growth in NF revenues from 
Medicare rehabilitation care grew dramatically from 1980 to 2000. Most NFs, over 90% in 201223, are 
dually certified and act as both Medicaid LTC facilities and Medicare skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). 
However, the presence of Medicare rehabilitation services in NF service delivery is a relatively new 
development. Formerly, NFs almost exclusively focused on traditional  custodial LTC for residents, 
often paid for by Medicaid, as opposed to rehabilitation services following hospitalization (“sub-acute 
care”) paid for by Medicare.24 Medicare’s spending on NF sub-acute care constituted 1.6% of total 
U.S. spending on nursing homes in 1980.25 Following the implementation of the inpatient prospective 
payment system, decreasing hospital length-of-stay created a new reliance on post-hospitalization 
rehabilitative care and the sub-acute market grew.26,27 By 2004, Medicare payments for sub-acute 
care were 13.9% of U.S. payments to nursing homes.28 This segment of NF business was more 
profitable to NFs than custodial LTC care, particularly that paid by Medicaid. Within the study period, 
Medicare margins for SNFs remained high and climbed over the decade, whereas non-Medicare 
margins remained negative over the decade (see Table 2.1). From 1999 to 2007, while the total 
number of Medicare beneficiaries receiving sub-acute SNF services grew by 33%, expenditures on 
these services increased by 88%.29 Due to the higher margins, the incentive to increase use of this 
new, more profitable Medicare SNF benefit, which requires a three-day hospitalization, likely changed 
NF behavior. Specifically, it may have altered the healthcare delivery to NFs’ custodial LTC patients, 
particularly inpatient and SNF services. 
In addition to major growth in the sub-acute portion of NF revenues, Medicaid payments to 
NFs also changed during the study period. Many states implemented Medicaid bed-hold policies, 
where they paid NFs to “hold” beds for residents receiving Medicaid-paid LTC who were admitted to 
hospitals—this allowed the NF to receive payment and provide no services while residents were 
hospitalized. Evidence suggests that this incentive increased hospitalizations in dually certified NFs. 
Intrator and colleagues found that hospitalization odds were higher by 36% in states with bed-hold 
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policies.30 In a similar study, Grabowski and colleagues found that state introduction of a Medicaid 
bed-hold policy increased 30-day rehospitalizations for Medicare patients by 1.8%.31 Because this 
change would constitute only a spillover effect from changing payments for hospitalization of 
Medicaid LTC patients, it is possible that hospitalization for long-stay Medicaid patients went up even 
higher. Implementation of these bed-hold policies evidently changed hospitalization practices for NF 
residents. 
Second, the ALF market grew dramatically, with large growth in for-profit entities offering 
assisted living services. These facilities provided custodial care to a disabled population. There is 
evidence that ALFs served a similar group of patients as NFs. In addition to providing help with ADLs 
and IADLs, ALFs can offer physical therapy, occupational therapy, and some skilled nursing services. 
Residents of ALFs also have a high degree of disability and very high levels of chronic conditions.32 
This descriptive information about resident similarity is validated by recent research, which suggests 
that ALFs may substitute for NF. One study found that a 10% increase in ALF capacity led to a 1.4% 
decline in NF private-pay occupancy and a 0.2–0.6% decline in overall NF patient acuity.33 In 
combination, it seems that ALFs offer an alternative to NF care for some clinically similar individuals.  
Though they are not providers of sub-acute SNF care, ALFs also faced incentives to increase 
medical care. One financial incentive is the existence of a de facto bed-hold policy. ALFs, which are 
mostly paid privately, often require continued payment if residents are hospitalized or are admitted to 
SNFs for rehabilitation. Thus, if a resident is hospitalized or admitted to an SNF, the facility receives 
“rent” but does not have to pay for labor to provide LTC. These bed/room-hold rates are often 
negotiated during admission to the ALFs and patients and their families can instead opt to be 
discharged and lose their bed or room. Most patients in ALFs are private pay, but some are paid for 
by Medicaid. Currently, only a handful of states have an ALF Medicaid “bed-hold” payment policy in 
such cases (similar to a NF Medicaid bed-hold payment), but such policies do exist.34 These bed hold 
policies may serve as an incentive to increase inpatient and SNF care for ALF residents. 
In addition to the payment incentives affecting hospitalization and SNF care, ALFs and NFs 
both faced liability concerns that may have encouraged them to increase medical care. Kaiser Family 
Foundation recently conducted a survey of LTC facilities, including a range of ALFs and NFs, to 
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understand why residents were hospitalized.35 Concerns about liability were a common financial 
concern that drove hospitalizations for both types of facilities. Additionally, the survey reported that 
physicians believe they receive higher compensation for visits when they see patients in the hospital 
versus the LTC facility. 
In addition to the changes to hospitalization and SNF incentives, policy and payment changes 
that impact physician and similar provider service use among facility LTC residents also occurred. 
Legislation in the late 1980s required NFs to provide regular physician (or substituting professional) 
assessments of residents at 30- or 60-day intervals.36 This legislation also strengthened the 
requirements for medical directors in LTC facilities (particularly NFs), which could lower barriers to 
physician care for those in LTC facilities. However, qualitative evidence after this legislation suggests 
that LTC facility residents experienced minimal access to physicians, with monitoring by nursing staff 
substituting for physician care.37 Lower reimbursement for and logistical difficulty in delivering care in 
LTC facilities38 and the national decrease in the number of geriatricians being trained39 could have 
affected the availability of physician services in LTC facilities. On balance, these factors may have 
canceled one another out and led to no effect of facility LTC use on Medicare expenditures on 
physician services. 
These changes, including the change in the NF financial environment and growth of ALFs, 
may have shaped or changed facility LTC providers’ effect on residents’ healthcare use. NFs and 
ALFs faced incentives to increase Medicare-reimbursed acute care because, if residents were 
hospitalized, facilities bore no costs of care while still receiving payments to hold the bed. ALFs had 
similar incentives when beneficiaries were admitted to SNFs following hospitalizations. NFs also had 
incentives to increase SNF sub-acute care, and encourage the required hospitalization, because they 
could then receive higher Medicare SNF payments, especially compared to Medicaid-paid LTC. 
These incentives drove my hypothesis that changing payment dynamics altered delivery of medical 
care to facility LTC users, particularly acute and SNF care. 
2.4. Research Question and Hypotheses 
Given the changes in the financial environment for LTC facilities, the overall objective of this 
research was to identify whether facility LTC use affects Medicare expenditures and healthcare 
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outcomes. My central hypothesis was that facility LTC use increased use of Medicare-covered 
service, relative to community LTC, due to financial incentives and increased access to providers. I 
tested my central hypothesis by pursuing the following three specific aims:  
Aim 1: To identify whether facility LTC affects Medicare expenditures for acute care and 
physician/practitioner services (e.g., nurse practitioner, etc.) among disabled older adults. 
Aim 2: To identify whether facility LTC affects Medicare expenditures for sub-acute care 
among disabled older adults. 
Aim 3: To determine whether facility LTC and its associated healthcare use result in 
potentially avoidable health services use, specifically emergency department (ED) visits, hospital 
observation days, and re-hospitalizations. 
I hypothesized that facility LTC use would increase expenditures on hospitalizations and sub-
acute care as well as counts of potentially avoidable health services use but would not affect 
expenditures on physician services, relative to community LTC.  
2.5. Conceptual Model  
To examine the research question and drive the hypotheses, this research relied on a 
conceptual model informed by both the Andersen Behavioral Model and an understanding of the 
financial environment for LTC providers. Andersen’s model identified three categories that explain 
healthcare service use, breaking characteristics into (1) predisposing characteristics (demographic 
descriptors such as age or race), (2) enabling factors (which allow healthcare service use to take 
place, such as proximity to providers, transportation, and insurance status), and (3) need for services 
(both perceived and real). 
My conceptual model borrows from the Andersen model to explain how healthcare needs and 
LTC needs can interact (Figure 2.1). This model makes a clear distinction between healthcare and 
LTC: healthcare needs are needs met by skilled services or technologies provided in the medical 
system (nursing, drugs, etc.) whereas LTC needs are disabilities that require help with activities of 
daily living (bathing, dressing, etc.) or instrumental activities of daily living (paying bills, etc.). These 
two needs, as well as the services that meet them, are separate but can interact. Most important, LTC 
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service use can result in changes to the enabling factors for healthcare service use (see highlighted 
pathway in Figure 2.1). 
Specifically, my conceptual model suggests that where LTC is delivered (“setting of LTC”) 
acts as an enabling characteristic for healthcare use. In particular, facilities that deliver LTC have 
increased access to healthcare services through relationships with hospitals or other providers. They 
may also have financial incentives to increase service use for some services, particularly acute and 
sub-acute care. These financial incentives take several forms and are described in detail in Section 
2.3. Due to the financial incentives for facilities, I hypothesized that individuals who receive facility 
LTC will have higher healthcare services use, particularly acute (Aim 1) and sub-acute care (Aim 2) 
and potentially avoidable healthcare use such as ED visits and readmissions (Aim 3), as a result of 
this enabling characteristic. In my model, facility LTC acts as a more potent enabling characteristic for 
healthcare use compared to community LTC. 
2.6. Instruments 
The conceptual model also supports the use of the proposed instruments to predict LTC 
setting within the study population (disabled older adults receiving LTC). Instrumental variables 
require you to identify exogenous variables (“instruments”) that will predict treatment. However, these 
variables must only affect your outcome through your treatment, once other covariates are controlled 
for (“the exclusion restriction”). I sought to identify instruments that would predict LTC setting (facility 
versus community LTC) but not healthcare use, outside of pathways for which I can explicitly control 
(income, education, race, etc.).  
Number of Adult Children 
Among disabled beneficiaries receiving LTC, a higher number of adult children should be 
correlated with a lower likelihood of receiving facility LTC. Number of adult children should act as an 
enabling characteristic for community LTC, because they provide informal caregiving that can entirely 
or partially meet an individuals’ LTC needs. However, number of adult children should predict neither 
co-morbidities nor acuity of disease that leads to healthcare use.  
Previous researchers have used number of adult children as an instrument to predict informal 
caregiving.40 The central theory is that the number of adult children is a supply factor for informal 
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caregiving (and thus increases the use of informal caregiving). Informal caregiving then acts as a 
substitute for facility LTC use. Thus, an increasing number of adult children should decrease facility 
LTC use.  
Currently, informal caregiving represents the bulk of long-term care in the United States. In 
addition to spouses, adult children are a major source of informal caregiving.41 For individuals ages 
60 to 75 living the community with 2+ ADLs, spouses act as primary caregivers for about 50% of 
adults and children act as primary caregivers for about 35% of adults. However, for those over age 
75, children provide the majority of caregiving.42  
The number of children can affect the availability of informal caregiving in multiple ways. 
Caregiving responsibilities may be shared across more siblings as family sizes grow.43 This can 
directly increase the availability of caregivers and the duration of informal caregiving, because sharing 
the workload could help prevent caregiver burnout. Both of these increase the supply of informal 
caregiving. Importantly, the protective effect against burnout, although enhanced by geographic 
proximity, is not entirely limited by geography. Adult children located at a distance can provide 
emotional support to a sibling providing primary caregiving support.44 This may bolster the quality 
(and duration) of informal caregiving available and thus the supply.  
Threats to the Exclusion Restriction 
First, although fertility and health status may be simultaneous for the childbearing population, 
there should be no direct causal relationship between previous fertility and current health needs for 
older adults. Fertility, with rare exceptions, ends well before the age of the study population (ages 50 
and older). 
There are several indirect effects that are possible. It is possible that previous fertility affects 
income among older adults and thus health status (e.g., a woman who quit working due to 
childbearing and childrearing may have saved less and, as a result, have less income as an older 
adult). However, income can be controlled for, using reported entry income and education levels (as a 
proxy).  
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Second, there is a possibility that previous fertility was affected by previous mental health 
status or previous health status, both of which could also affect an older adult’s current health status. 
However, current health status can be controlled for as well. 
Finally, there is the threat of unobservable characteristics that affect both previous fertility and 
current health status. Although this is always a risk for instruments, the time gap between previous 
fertility and current health status should allay some of these concerns. 
Supply of Assisted Living and CCRCs 
Among disabled beneficiaries receiving LTC, the supply of LTC facilities in a beneficiaries’ 
geographic area should not be correlated with healthcare service use once local healthcare facility 
supply is controlled for (e.g., hospitals, etc.). The local supply of ALFs and continuing care retirement 
communities (CCRCs) in particular should act as an enabling characteristic for facility LTC service 
use but not of healthcare use.  
Changes in the geographic supply of LTC facilities over the study period could predict LTC 
facility residence. As the U.S. population ages, the supply of ALFs and CCRCs has increased rapidly, 
especially in the early part of the study period (2000–2006) but varied substantially by geography, so 
there was expected to be substantial variation in these items over the study period.45  
There are multiple pathways through which supply of ALFs and CCRCs could affect LTC 
facility use. First, the availability of these facilities may act as a substitute for nursing home care. 
Recent research suggests that the availability of ALFs decreases low-care nursing home residents 
marginally.46 There are other pathways in which assisted living facilities do not act as substitutes but 
as complements. These pathways assume that, on average, these types of facilities may be a more 
palatable setting than a traditional NFs for older adults who consider themselves only minorly 
disabled (but are unable to live independently). The availability of an ALF or CCRC in one’s area may 
offer a “facility entry point” for someone who would otherwise enter a NF but perhaps cannot find one 
with beds available or suitable to their preferences or for someone who had disabilities but did not 
feel disabled enough to enter one. Both types of individuals may enter a NF at a later point. A third 
minor pathway is that increased availability of these facilities may make residence in any kind of LTC 
facility more palatable and encourage individuals to move into some other kind of LTC facility. 
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Notably, individuals most likely to be influenced by these supply factors are individuals who 
are able to afford to pay for ALFs and CCRCs. Although new surveys reflect that ALFs are more 
varied in price and luxury than was formerly understood, residential care facilities still serve a 
primarily private-pay population.47 Thus, the treatment effect of this instrument will be concentrated 
among individuals able to afford private-pay LTC. However, because approximately 40% of 
residential care facilities had at least one resident for whom LTC was paid, in some part, by 
Medicaid,48 the effect should not only be to upper-income populations.  
Threats to the Exclusion Restriction 
Because Medicare does not directly pay for LTC and these facilities (CCRCs and ALFs) do 
not also supply healthcare, the availability of ALFs and CCRCs should not affect individuals’ 
healthcare use unless they are living in the facility. Thus, there should be no direct effects that violate 
the exclusion restriction. 
There is one primary indirect effect that supply of these facilities could have on healthcare 
use. Economic prosperity could have increased the supply of both these facilities and other 
healthcare facilities simultaneously. As a result, economic prosperity (which increases the availability 
of these facilities) could also increase healthcare spending for individuals. However, we can control 
for geographic characteristics, time trends, and other healthcare provider supply characteristics 
(e.g.,skilled nursing facilities) that would act as the pathway for the effect of economic prosperity.  
Supply of Home-Delivered Meals 
The availability of publicly funded community LTC support such as Meals on Wheels could 
act as a supply factor that increases community LTC use. Home-delivered meals likely act as a 
complement to other informal and formal caregiving in the community. However, because it is 
determined at an area level, it does not co-vary with individual-level LTC need characteristics that 
could also affect healthcare access (such as dementia, etc.). Emerging research validates this 
hypothesis. State spending on OAA-funded Meals on Wheels decreased the prevalence of nursing 
facility residents that were classified as low-care.49 The study was at the state level, included 
community-level fixed effects, and suggested that increased access to these programs may decrease 
likelihood of nursing facility admission among individuals able to live in the community. 
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Threats to the Exclusion Restriction 
Funding for Meals on Wheels may be predicted by other community-level factors that also 
affect healthcare availability and delivery. State-wide commitment to community LTC as well as other 
factors that may also affect healthcare use, such as Medicaid funding, could affect Meals on Wheels. 
Thus, we controlled for average state Medicaid per diem for nursing facilities and the percentage of 
state Medicaid budgets spent on home-and-community-based services. It is also likely that state 
funding for Meals on Wheels is also affected by the general community-level supply factors that were 
previously discussed and were controlled for in the analysis. 
 
Table 2.1. 
Nursing Facility Margins 
 
 
  
Medicare50 17%51 9.4%52 13.7% 13.3% 16.6% 18.5% 
For-profit53 
  16.1% 15.7% 19.1% 20.7% 
Non-profit54 
  3.5% 3.5% 6.9% 9.5% 
Non-Medicare55 -.7% -2.8% -1.3% -.9% -2.6% -1.2% 
Overall56 .9% 1.1% 1.7% 2.2% 2.1% 3.6 
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Figure 2.1. Conceptual model. 
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CHAPTER 3. APPROACH 
3.1. Overview and Rationale 
This study sought to identify the comparative effect of incident facility LTC versus community 
LTC on Medicare expenditures and potentially avoidable healthcare use. To achieve this objective, 
the study used nationally collected survey and claims data in an observational design. A major 
challenge to achieving the study purpose was methodological. Both multi-morbidity and mortality 
directly increase healthcare use and are highly prevalent among disabled older adults. Because of 
this high prevalence, it is difficult to identify adequate control groups for individuals who receive 
facility LTC. However, by using advanced econometric techniques, including instrumental variables 
(IVs), this research sought to address selection effects and determine the independent effect of 
facility LTC use on Medicare expenditures. Additionally, given the higher risk of mortality in our older, 
disabled population of interest, the approach sought to account for competing risk from mortality by 
using survival-adjusted models, which explicitly model mortality, where it was feasible. 
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), a nationally representative survey 
matched with claims data, served as the primary data source. Each of the study aims used an IV 
approach to compensate for possible selection effects when comparing beneficiaries receiving facility 
LTC versus community LTC. The potential instruments predicting likelihood of facility LTC versus 
community LTC were the same for all aims and included (1) number of adult children, (2) supply of 
LTC facilities in their geographic area (e.g., assisted living facilities (ALF) and continuing care 
retirement communities (CCRC), etc.), and (3) state-level funding for home-delivered meals for 
homebound individuals (Meals on Wheels). Each aim also incorporated survival-adjusted 
methodologies,57 because this is the best measure of cost in a population with higher likelihood of 
death. To determine the effect of LTC setting on service-specific Medicare expenditures, Aim 1 used 
generalized linear models with dependent variables of Medicare expenditures on acute and 
physician/practitioner services. Aim 2 also used generalized linear model with a dependent variable of 
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Medicare expenditures on sub-acute services, including skilled nursing facility (SNF), home health, 
and hospice care. To determine the effect on avoidable health services use, Aim 3 used generalized 
linear models estimating counts (ED visits and number of hospital observation days) and maximum 
likelihood models estimating likelihood of any services (30- and 60-day hospital readmission). 
3.2. Data Sources 
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) comprised the bulk of the data used in all 
Aims. The MCBS is a nationally representative panel survey of Medicare beneficiaries. Panels are 
introduced annually and followed for four years (see Figure 3.1). Survey information is available only 
for the fall of each year (Figure 3.1). In addition to collecting demographic information, the MCBS 
survey asks participants questions about disability, LTC services, and health status. The survey data 
is matched to other information that is gathered continuously, including Medicare claims containing 
the healthcare service use and expenditures of participants and residence tracking (such as between 
the community and a facility). The file includes information about geographic location of participants 
(to the zip code level). I combined information from the Access to Care file and the Cost & Use file to 
obtain survey information for four consecutive calendar years and used claims information from the 
Cost & Use file to provide Medicare service use for the later three years.  
The U.S. Census ZIP Code Business Patterns provided additional data on the local supply of 
LTC providers in the study participants’ geographic area. The Zip Code Business Patterns are 
intended to provide information on employers in geographic areas.58 I used them to identify the 
number of assisted living facilities (ALFs) and continuing retirement communities (CCRCs) in each zip 
code in each year (proposed instruments) as well as the number of SNFs (controls). I matched these 
supply characteristics to MCBS participants using the zip code. Additionally, I used 2000–2009 
spending data from the State Program Reports, which are publicly available from the Administration 
on Aging.59 These provided data on state spending on home-delivered meals (proposed instrument) 
funded through Title III-C2 of the Older Americans Act of 1965, which I translated into per capita 
amounts for the over 65 population. Medicaid payment rates for NFs and percent of Medicaid 
spending on home and community-based services (HCBS) came from the Brown University 
LTCFocus Web site. I combined these sources to create an analytical file that followed MCBS 
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participants in the survey for years 2000–2009 and included their survey responses and LTC supply 
over time. 
3.3. Sample 
I sought to identify a sample of individuals who are at risk for facility LTC use or at equipoise 
between facility and community LTC. To identify this group, I needed to identify individuals who could 
feasibly receive community LTC and do not have to receive facility LTC. Thus, the sampling frame 
included individuals who enter the MCBS living in the community and did not use facility LTC for the 
first three months in the survey (see Figure 3.2). Medicare-paid skilled nursing facility (SNF) stays 
alone did not qualify as facility LTC use (and thus an exclusion from the sampling frame), because 
these are healthcare services, as defined in the conceptual model, and an outcome of Aim 2 of this 
dissertation. However, if the three-month look-back period only included a Medicare-paid SNF stay, 
the individual was excluded, because prior use of facility LTC before the SNF stay was unknown.  
To delineate the time period in which someone was eligible for treatment versus the outcome 
period, I defined 3 time categories: a wash-out period for their first three months in the survey 
(January–March), a treatment period of from April 1 to March 31, and an outcome period from April 1 
until the end of their participation in the MCBS (see Figure 3.3). To ensure there were enough treated 
individuals, there were two treatment periods per cohort (see Figure 3.3). We included a second 
potential treatment window (April 1, Year 2, to March 31, Year 3) for those who were eligible for but 
did not use facility LTC during the first treatment window. Controls were identified from those who 
received community-based LTC during the first treatment period for each cohort.  
As discussed, the sampling frame included individuals who entered the MCBS living in the 
community and did not use facility LTC during the wash-out period, with a few additional exclusion 
criteria. Medicare beneficiaries under the age of fifty were excluded. If individuals entered a mental 
health or psychiatric center or residence for the care of the mentally retarded/developmentally 
disabled at any point during the survey, they were not included in the sampling frame. If an individual 
had missing information on the number of adult children or if they lived in Puerto Rico, they were also 
excluded. 
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Sample Identification 
Within the sampling frame specified (those at risk of facility LTC use), I identified two 
samples: 
Sample #1: The first sample was a clinically similar group of patients gathered by matching 
community LTC users to facility LTC users by age. I separated out individuals in the sampling frame 
into 3-year age “bins” (i.e. 50–52, 53–55, etc.). For each individual who used facility LTC during the 
treatment window, I randomly selected three individuals in the same three-year age bin  (ages 50+) 
who received community-based LTC. I used a “greedy” matching process in which community LTC 
users (controls) could be sampled multiple times. This allowed me to homogenize the sample and 
ensured I was using the instrument to predict facility LTC use in a similar group of individuals. This 
group of facility LTC and community LTC users comprised Sample 1. 
Sample #2: The second sample was comprised from all discharges that occurred during the 
outcome period for all facility LTC users (treated) and community LTC users (controls) individuals 
outlined in the sampling frame.  
3.4. Key Variables and Measures 
Exposures 
The most critical measure was treatment, or receipt of LTC. Incident facility LTC (treatment 
initiation) occurred when someone moved to a LTC facility during the treatment period (after they 
began the survey in the community and used no facility LTC during the wash-out period). For this 
analysis, LTC facilities included NFs, ALFs (which includes board & care home, domiciliary care 
facilities, personal care facilities, rest home/retirement homes), and CCRCs.  
The decision to include ALF residents with NF residents among the treated was threefold. 
ALFs (1) act as financial entities with responsibilities for financial stewardship and, in many cases, 
profitability; (2) face financial incentives to increase medical care (similar to NFs); and (3) house 
clinically similar patients, some of whom go on to receive nursing facility care. First, ALFs act as 
independent financial entities that house residents, have at least some say in their medical treatment, 
and yet must prioritize financial concerns to remain open. Although there is heterogeneity in ALFs 
from small private homes to corporately owned, large facilities, over 80% of facilities were for-profit by 
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2010.60 These facilities must balance patient care concerns with their own financial well-being. 
Second, although ALFs do not offer SNF care, they still face incentives to increase medical care. One 
financial incentive is the existence of a de facto bed-hold policy for private-pay residents, detailed in 
the conceptual model (Section 2.3). Liability is likely another major incentive to increase medical care, 
especially because ALFs may have less medical staff than NFs. Third, there is not a definitive clinical 
distinction between residents of NFs and ALFs. In addition to providing help with functional 
limitations, ALFs can offer physical therapy, occupational therapy, and some skilled nursing services. 
Residents of ALFs have a high degree of disability and very high levels of chronic conditions.61 This 
descriptive information is validated by recent research, which suggests that ALFs may substitute for 
NF care. One study found that a 10% increase in ALF capacity led to a 1.4% decline in NF private-
pay occupancy and a 0.2–0.6% decline in overall NF patient acuity.62 In combination, it seems that 
ALFs offer an alternative to NF care for some clinically similar individuals. Finally, many ALF users in 
our sample go on to use NF care (only 19% of sample 1 used exclusively ALFs). In summary, 
because ALFs face financial incentives to increase healthcare, the care they deliver is similar to care 
delivered in a NF, and residents often go on to receive NF care, residents who entered an ALF for the 
first time were grouped among the treated for this analysis. 
Individuals received “community LTC” if they reported receiving help with any ADL in their 
survey responses during the treatment period and lived in the community for the entirety of the 
survey. If they received Medicare-covered SNF care with no accompanying Medicaid or private pay-
covered LTC facility stay, they were still considered to have lived in the community. 
Outcomes 
The outcomes data, including all Medicare expenditures and service use, was gathered from 
Medicare fee-for-service claims. The MCBS provides extensive claims information, which undergoes 
a rigorous reconciliation process. Monthly expenditures outcomes were generated from claims and 
allocated to calendar months. If a claim covered more than one month, the claim was split by the 
proportion of days of the claim within that calendar month. Claims were converted to 2004 real dollars 
using the medical consumer price index, because much LTCFocus data used 2004 dollars. Inpatient 
claims were used for the inpatient outcome; physician claims were used for the physician and 
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provider outcome; SNF, home health, and hospice claims were used for the sub-acute expenditure 
outcome; outpatient claims were used for ED visits (identified using revenue center codes 450–459 or 
981); and observation days were identified using the outpatient and inpatient claims. Readmissions 
were identified using the Yale All-Cause Readmission Definition63 and generated from the inpatient 
claims file. See Table 3.1 for a summary of dependent variables by aim and source claims files. 
Covariates 
I sought to identify and operationalize the key pre-disposing, enabling, and need factors for 
healthcare use among disabled older adults (listed in Table 3.2) as covariates. All variables listed 
came from the MCBS from the fall prior to the treatment window, with the exception of local-level 
healthcare supply and LTC funding, which came from the year the treatment window started.  
I included predisposing characteristics including age, gender, level of education (high school, 
some college, and college graduate), and race (African American), all of which were gathered via 
self-report. The lack of inclusion of more granular race and ethnicity categories was due to very low 
numbers in the treated sample. I included enabling characteristics such as Medicaid eligibility at any 
point in the year preceding the treatment window, rural residence (three categories defined by RUCA 
codes by zip code), Census region geographic area, and elements predicting LTC service use (state 
Medicaid % spending on HCBS, state NF per diem rates). Local healthcare supply was intended to 
be hospital and SNF counts in the beneficiary’s zip code but low variation in hospital counts led to 
collinearity and thus only SNF counts were used. 
Functional status was the primary identification of disability and LTC need. Functional status 
was generally measured by a person’s level of dependence in ADLs (bathing, dressing, eating, 
getting out of chair, walking, and toileting) or IADLs (using the telephone, doing light housework, 
doing heavy housework, preparing meals, shopping, and paying bills). In the community, the variable 
asks whether the individual usually has any difficulty with an ADL and the potential responses are 
yes, no, or does not do (in which case there is a follow-up question of whether the individual does not 
do them due to health problems). Thus, for ADL variables, I combined responses to create six binary 
variables indicating any difficulty in the corresponding six ADLs. From this, I created a continuous 
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measure for ADL disability to account for the gradation of ADL disabilities by taking the sum of all six 
of the binary ADL variables. 
To capture if a person considered him or herself semi-independent physically while still 
exhibiting some functional dependence, I created another variable that indicates that the person 
exhibits any IADL needs. Similar to ADLs, the MCBS asks whether the individual usually has any 
difficulty with using the telephone, and the potential responses are yes, no, or does not do (in which 
case there is a follow-up question of whether the individual does not do them due to health problems). 
For IADLs, I created a single binary variable indicating difficulty in any IADL and counted any 
indication of difficulty with any of these activities. However, almost the entire sample had IADL 
disability, thus we were not able to include it in the final model. Finally, I used survey responses on a 
variety of cognitive functional measures to assess presence of any cognitive limitation. 
The most important healthcare need factors were diagnoses. To identify co-morbidities, I 
used survey responses of whether someone had ever received a variety of diagnoses including hip 
fracture, breathing problems (including asthma, emphysema, or COPD), Alzheimer’s, diabetes, non-
skin cancer, stroke, congestive heart failure, hypertension, angina, arteriosclerotic heart disease, 
myocardial infarction, and heart arrhythmias.  
Instruments 
Number of adult children was taken from survey responses and run as a continuous variable. 
Zip-code level counts of ALFs and CCRCs were represented as counts and were also continuous. 
State spending on Meals on Wheels was translated to state per capita spending for the over-65 
population and translated to 2004 dollars, to be consistent with all dollar measures in the analysis. 
3.5. Analytic Files 
I constructed two analytic files. The first file (Analytic File #1) contained observations as a 
person-period record. Periods were calendar months. All participants had a record for all periods, 
even after death or censoring. In addition to all covariates and dependent variables, each observation 
included an indicator of whether the beneficiary died within the period () and an indicator of whether 
the beneficiary was censored at any point before the end of the period or died in a previous period 
(). Individuals were censored at any point if they enrolled in a Medicare HMO (including the first 
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period), because the outcome of Medicare costs was no longer observable. The second file (Analytic 
File #2) was limited to individuals with hospital discharges and had observations as person–hospital 
discharge combinations. It included indicators for 30- and 60-day readmission in each file, death 
within 30 or 60 days, or censoring within 30 or 60 days due to HMO enrollment or survey roll-off. 
3.6.  General Analytic Approach 
I implemented an IV approach for all outcomes, using survival-adjusted methods64 for all 
outcomes except 30- and 60-day readmissions. IVs accounted for unobservable differences between 
facility and community LTC users. The survival-adjusted model allowed me to decompose the total 
effect of facility LTC on healthcare service use to a portion due to service intensity versus a portion 
due to survival differences.  
Main treatment was use of facility LTC (). The first stage (eq1) predicted facility LTC based 
on included covariates and instrumental variables, as discussed in the conceptual model. X was a 
vector of the pre-disposing, enabling, and need characteristics listed in Table 3.2.  
   	
   	    	          (eq1) 
The second stage models estimated survival and healthcare use (̂. They included the 
residuals from eq1 (because all second stages incorporated non-linear estimation techniques)65 as 
well as the treatment of facility LTC ( and other pre-disposing, enabling, and need 
characteristics () listed in Table 3.2 but excluded the instruments. 
The specification of the second-stage models for each Aim is listed in Table 3.3. For models 
6 and 7 (Table 3.3), I constructed a logistic model estimating likelihood of hospital readmission as the 
second stage. For models 1–5 (Table 3.3), I estimated the survival-adjusted healthcare use in the 
following steps: (1) for all person-periods in which the beneficiary survived and was not censored, I 
estimated a survival model using discrete-time methods and logistic regression, which allowed me to 
calculate the hazard function for death , ! and the predicted probability of survival "#, !, as well 
as the marginal effect of facility LTC on each of these; (2) for all person-periods when the beneficiary 
died, I estimated the period’s predicted healthcare service ̂, ! and the marginal effect of facility 
LTC on healthcare service $̂, ! $⁄ ; (3) for all person-periods when the beneficiary survived and 
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was uncensored, I estimated the period’s predicted healthcare service ̂, ! and the marginal 
effect of treatment on healthcare service $̂, ! $⁄ .66 
In a survival model, the estimated healthcare service use in a given period for any individual 
is ̂  "#  &   ̂   1 (   ̂), or the weighted sum of the utilization 
conditional on survival to that period and death in that period. The total estimated utilization over the 
period ̂ is the sum of the period-specific estimates ̂   ∑ ̂+, . The marginal effect of a 
covariate in X—for example, receiving LTC in a facility—on ̂ can be broken down into individual 
effects on utilization due to survival differences (first curly bracket in eq 2) and service intensity 
(second curly bracket).67 
$̂ $⁄  ∑
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   (eq2) 
Each element of the marginal effect was calculated through the steps listed previously. The final step 
involved combining these estimates to calculate the total marginal effects (eq2), which was also 
presented as the two partial effects due to service intensity versus survival differences.  
In all models, we used a two-staged residual inclusion technique, as mentioned previously.68 
However, for the survival-adjusted models (all models except for readmission), we implemented a 
2SRI-based strategy with two deviations from the typical approach. First, we used the residual in the 
probit space rather than the more common probability space, analogous to the inverse Mills ratio in a 
classic Heckman model.69 Second, due to collinearity between the residual and the covariates (mean 
variance inflation factor >10), we had poorly behaved estimation algorithms. Thus, we simulated the 
residual by conducting multiple replications with a random draw from the standard normal distribution 
consistent with the parameter estimates. We simulated a value of   > given the true value of 
treatment (similar to but not the same as the Inverse Mills Ratio). The major advantage of this 
approach is that it allowed us to include a residual term but eliminated problems with collinearity. The 
major disadvantage of this approach is that it is really   >   F (the simulated piece) and thus is a 
noisy estimate of   >. Measurement error tends to bias coefficients on the residual toward zero and 
creates risk of finding no effect or a smaller effect when there is an effect or larger effect. This could 
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cause tests of endogeneity (such as the test of the significance of the residual term in the second 
stage) to fail to reject exogeneity when, in fact, endogeneity is present. Thus, we conducted a range 
of endogeneity tests and implemented models as IVs, to be conservative. 
Aim 1: Analyses 
I constructed two different second-stage models with similar structure and analysis for each 
but with different dependent variables (see Table 3.3). I constructed both models using Analytic File 
#1. The survival-adjusted approach described in the General Analytic Strategy was the same across 
both models. As mentioned in the general analytic approach, the instrumented variable was facility 
LTC. I applied a generalized linear model for both second-stage models. The dependent variable was 
expenditures on inpatient care in Model 1 and, for Model 2, expenditures on physician and 
practitioner services (e.g., nurse practitioner, physical therapy, etc.), including outpatient labs. I 
bootstrapped 5,000 replications to obtain standard errors for both predicted services use and 
marginal effects of facility LTC.  
Aim 2: Analysis 
The approach, including the model specification, was the same as Aim 1 (see Table 3.3). For 
this Aim, I used Analytic File #1. Again, the instrumented variable was use of facility LTC. I applied a 
generalized linear model in the second stage. The dependent variable was Medicare expenditures on 
SNF, home health, and hospice care. I bootstrapped to obtain standard errors for both predicted 
service use and marginal effects of facility LTC.  
Aim 3: Analyses 
The third aim used instrumental variables to estimate the effect of facility LTC on potentially 
avoidable services use over time. I planned to estimate five different models with different dependent 
variables (see Table 3.3). In this aim, all dependent variables for ED visits, hospital observation days, 
and re-admissions were binary or count measures. 
For models 4 and 5, I planned to use a survival-adjusted generalized linear model using a 
Poisson link to estimate counts of ED visits within the time period and counts of hospital observation 
days. I conducted models 4 and 5 using Analytic File #1. However, due to an insufficient number of 
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observation days in the sample, I was not able to implement the model for the observation days 
(model 4) and only modeled ED visits (model 5).  
For models 6 and 7, I planned to use logistic regression to estimate the treatment’s effect on 
likelihood of 30-day and 60-day hospital readmission. Models 6 and 7 used Sample #2, which 
includes only those with a hospital admission. The logistic model specifies the likelihood of 
readmission as  
ProbReadmit|XT   4U 1  4U⁄ , where T	  	
   	 (   	V  T   T  W  (eq6) 
Again, X is a vector of pre-disposing, enabling, and need characteristics listed in Table 3.2. I 
bootstrapped to obtain standard errors for both predicted services use and marginal effects of facility 
LTC.  
3.7. Sample Size and Statistical Power 
For all aims, incident facility LTC users comprised the treatment group. Using the sampling 
frame explained earlier, I initially estimated that I would have roughly 1000 incident facility LTC 
person-year combinations. Although these numbers were roughly met (n=985), censoring due to 
HMO enrollment and admission to a psychiatric hospital reduced the treated group to n=864. Initial 
power calculations were made using the programs powerreg and powerlog for Stata 11.0. These 
analyses allow me to detect the required sample size to detect a minimum effect size—α=0.05 with 
power ≥ 80%. To change predictive accuracy of the R2=.01 from the addition of my key variable 
(facility LTC) with 30 control variables, I would need a sample size of 780 for continuous outcomes 
(spending). To detect a change in .05 predicted probability of a dichotomous outcome, I would need a 
sample size of 630. In both instances the estimated N of incident facility LTC person-year 
combinations gives a sufficient sample size for Sample 1. For the dependent variable of 
readmissions, due to the high healthcare use of this population, I expected this to be a majority of 
incident facility LTC users. To detect a change in α=.05 predicted probability of a dichotomous 
outcome, I needed a sample size of cases of 480 with power ≥ 75%. However, because I had 
approximately 430 readmissions within 30 days and 550 readmissions within 60 days, I may have 
insufficient power to test the effect on readmissions within 30 days and 60 days. To address the 
 sufficiency of power, I included a composite outcome of death or readmiss
for 30 day readmission up to 840 and for 60 day
 
Figure 3.1. Structure of Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
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ion, which increased cases 
 readmission up to 1,068.  
. 
 
 
 Figure 3.2. Sampling frame and exclusion c
 
 
Figure 3.3. Study period segmentation
 
 
 
27 
riteria. 
 
. 
 
 
 28 
Table 3.1. 
Dependent Variables and Source Files 
Aim Dependent Variable Source Claims File Additional Notes 
1 
Medicare Acute Care 
Expenditures Inpatient  
Medicare 
Physician/Practitioner 
Expenditures 
Physician  
2 Medicare Sub-Acute Care Expenditures 
SNF, Home Health, and 
Hospice  
3 
 
Number of ED Visits Outpatient  Revenue center codes 450-459 or 981  
Number of Hospital 
Observation Days 
Outpatient and 
Inpatient  
Revenue Center codes and 
HCPCS codes 
Likelihood of 30-day 
hospital readmissions Inpatient  
Yale All-Cause Unplanned 
Hospital Readmission 
Likelihood of 60-day 
hospital readmissions Inpatient  
Yale All-Cause Hospital 
Readmission 
 
 
Table 3.2. 
Covariates 
 
Factors Affecting Health Care Use Variable Type 
Predisposing  Age Continuous 
  Gender  Categorical 
  Marital Status Categorical 
  Education (Highest) Categorical 
  Race/Ethnicity Categorical 
Enabling Medicaid Eligibility Categorical 
  Geographic Location (RUCA Codes) Categorical 
 
State LTC Spending (% Medicaid on HCBS, Medicaid 
NF per diem) Continuous 
 
Local LTC Supply (Hospital SNF counts by Zip Code) Continuous 
Need Diagnoses Categorical 
  Cognitive Limitations Categorical 
 Charlson Comorbidity Index Continuous 
  ADLs Continuous  
 Any IADL Categorical 
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Table 3.3. 
Second Stage Models  
Model Specification   
Aim Model Dependent Variable Second Stage Model Sample Restrictions 
1 
1 Medicare Acute Care Expenditures 
Survival-adjusted Generalized 
Linear Model None (Analytic File 1) 
2 
Medicare 
Physician/Practitioner 
Expenditures 
Survival-adjusted Generalized 
Linear Model None (Analytic File 1) 
2 3 Medicare Sub-Acute Care Expenditures 
Survival-adjusted Generalized 
Linear Model None (Analytic File 1) 
3 
 
4 Number of ED Visits Survival-adjusted Generalized Linear Model  None (Analytic File 1) 
5 Number of Hospital Observation Days 
Survival-adjusted Generalized 
Linear Model None (Analytic File 1) 
6 Likelihood of 30-day hospital readmissions Logit Model 
Individuals with ≥1 
hospital stay (Analytic 
File 2) 
7 Likelihood of 60-day hospital readmissions Logit Model 
Individuals with ≥1 
hospital stay (Analytic 
File 2) 
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CHAPTER 4. AIM 1 
4.1. Introduction 
Identifying strategies to bend the Medicare cost-curve is a significant and ongoing policy 
concern.70,71 Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities are among the highest cost beneficiaries to Medicare, 
even after adjusting for comorbidity.72,73,74,75,76 Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions and 
disabilities have higher spending than individuals with chronic conditions only, regardless of the number 
of comorbidities.77 Due to the disproportionate healthcare spending on this population, new policies and 
programs introduced under the Affordable Care Act (e.g., ACOs, the Community-based Care Transitions 
Program, etc.) will need to target older, disabled Medicare beneficiaries to achieve Medicare savings. 
However, to successfully reduce only excess healthcare use, policymakers must first understand what 
drives the outsized healthcare spending on this vulnerable population. 
One important driver of healthcare costs among older Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities is 
long-term care (LTC) that helps with activities of daily activities (e.g., bathing, eating). LTC may be 
delivered in community settings (e.g., patients’ homes) by paid or unpaid caregivers or in facilities such as 
nursing facilities (NF) and assisted living facilities (ALF). Although Medicare does not cover custodial 
facility-based LTC, LTC facilities have consistent, ongoing interactions with residents and likely influence 
their Medicare-covered healthcare use. Experimental demonstrations in the 1970s and 1980s found no 
difference in healthcare costs between those receiving community-based LTC versus NF care.78 
However, since these demonstrations, changes in the financial environment for LTC facilities created new 
incentives for facility LTC providers to increase healthcare use by their residents. Given the new 
environment, the purpose of this study was to explore whether LTC setting (community versus facility) 
affects Medicare expenditures for inpatient or physician services among older beneficiaries with 
disabilities. 
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Changing Environment for LTC Facilities since the 1980s 
Since the Medicare experimental demonstrations that showed no difference in healthcare costs 
by LTC setting, several changes in the payment dynamics for LTC facilities may have increased 
hospitalizations for facility LTC residents. First, prospective payment systems decreased hospital length 
of stays and increased reliance on sub-acute skilled nursing facility (SNF) care following hospitalization.79 
Medicare paid well for these sub-acute services, particularly in the 1990s, and NFs began to focus on the 
relative profitability of Medicare reimbursement for sub-acute SNF care compared to Medicaid 
reimbursement for traditional custodial NF care. As a result, from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, NFs 
increasingly focused on sub-acute care and revenue from SNF patients, despite Medicare policy changes 
that attempted to stem cost growth in this area.80 Receiving Medicare-covered SNF rehabilitation benefits 
required a qualifying 3-day hospitalization. Therefore, an incentive to shift patients from Medicaid-
reimbursed NF care to Medicare-reimbursed SNF care could have increased hospitalization rates among 
NF residents.  
Second, many states implemented Medicaid bed-hold policies for custodial LTC, where Medicaid 
paid NFs to hold beds for enrollees admitted to the hospital. These bed-hold policies allowed NFs to 
receive payment from Medicaid without providing services. Although the payment protected residents 
from losing their spots, these bed-hold payments increased hospitalizations for NF residents.81,82  
Third, the ALF market grew dramatically83 and Medicaid began paying ALFs for LTC services. 
ALFs substituted for NF services in certain patient populations.84 Additionally, ALFs faced incentives to 
increase hospitalizations of their residents, because ALFs often required continued private-pay payment 
when residents were hospitalized.85 Similar to the Medicaid bed-hold policy in NFs, continued payments 
without the costs of providing LTC created an incentive to hospitalize ALF residents. Finally, concerns 
about liability and physician accessibility and reimbursement may have created incentives for both NFs 
and ALFs to hospitalize patients.86  
Although most policy changes favored increased hospitalizations of facility LTC residents, it is 
unclear how policy and payment changes from the 1990s to the 2000s affected physician service use 
among facility LTC residents. Two factors may have increased facility LTC residents’ use of physician 
services. First, OBRA legislation of the late 1980s required NFs to provide regular physician (or 
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substituting professional) assessments of residents at 30- or 60-day intervals.87 Second, OBRA 
strengthened requirements for medical directors in LTC facilities (particularly NFs), which could lower 
barriers to physician care for those in LTC facilities relative to disabled individuals in the community. 
However, qualitative evidence suggests that LTC facility residents experienced minimal access to 
physicians,88 with monitoring by nursing staff substituting for physician care. Lower reimbursement, 
logistical difficulty in delivering care in LTC facilities,89 and the national decrease in the number of 
geriatricians being trained90 could have reduced the supply of physician services in LTC facilities. On 
balance, these factors may have canceled one another out and led to no effect of facility LTC use on 
Medicare expenditures on physician services. 
Research on LTC Setting in the New Financial and Policy Environment 
Since these changes, there has been limited research revisiting the effect of LTC setting on 
Medicare expenditures. The receipt of informal care decreased Medicare expenditures on acute services 
in the early 1990s.91,92 Other studies found that bed-hold policies were associated with higher 
hospitalization rates among NF residents93,94 and, among dual eligibles, residence in NFs relative to the 
community increased their risk of hospitalization.95 However, researchers have not revisited the effect of 
facility LTC in the general LTC population, and none of these studies explicitly modeled the effects of 
mortality and its potential role in healthcare service use.  
Given the urgency of scrutinizing Medicare costs and the changes in the LTC facility landscape, 
we examined whether and to what extent incident facility LTC affects Medicare expenditures for inpatient 
care and physician expenses. We hypothesized that, among older Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities, 
those receiving facility LTC would have higher Medicare expenditures for inpatient care but not for 
physician care compared to those receiving community LTC.  
4.2. Methods 
We tested our hypothesis using an instrumental variables (IV) approach within a survival-adjusted 
model to account for (1) the likelihood of unobservable differences between facility LTC versus 
community LTC users and (2) the prevalence of mortality among older and disabled adults.  
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Survival-Adjusted Model Construction 
Because the population of interest had a non-trivial risk of death, end-of-life associated costs 
were an important component of their healthcare expenditures. Traditional modeling that predicts 
resource use when death is a competing risk, such as multinomial models, often treat death and 
healthcare service use as mutually exclusive outcomes, which they are not. Alternatively, researchers 
might exclude those who die, yet death may be on the pathway through which treatment affects costs. 
Healthcare costs around the time of death tend to increase, yet death also acts as a competing risk for 
healthcare use and can decrease healthcare costs because there is no opportunity to use services (and 
incur costs) after death.  
Thus, we modeled Medicare expenditures using survival-adjusted methods that explicitly model 
the role of survival trajectories in healthcare service use. They also allow decomposition of a treatment 
effect on expenditures into two parts: (1) changes in patient survival and (2) intensity of service use.96,97 In 
brief, we estimated three different models: (1) a survival model for all person-periods in which the 
beneficiary survived and was not censored using discrete-time survival methods and a probit model; this 
allowed us to calculate the hazard function for death , ! and the predicted probability of survival 
"#, !, as well as the marginal effect of facility LTC on each of these; (2) a generalized linear model 
predicting expenditures conditional on death in that period, from which we generated the period’s 
predicted expenditures ̂  , ! and the marginal effect of facility LTC on expenditures $̂, ! $⁄ ; and 
(3) a generalized linear model estimating expenditures conditional on survival in the period, from which 
we estimated the period’s predicted expenditures ̂, ! and the marginal effect of facility LTC on 
expenditures $̂, ! $⁄ . A modified Park Test was used to identify the correct family in the 
generalized linear models. 
In a survival model, the estimated healthcare service expenditure in a given period for any 
individual is ̂  "#  &   ̂   1 (   ̂), or the weighted sum of the expenditures 
conditional on survival to that period and death in that period. The total estimated expenditure over the 
period ̂ is the sum of the period-specific estimates ̂   ∑ ̂+, . The marginal effect of a 
covariate in X—for example, receiving LTC in a facility—on ̂ can be broken down into individual effects 
 34 
on expenditures due to survival differences (first curly bracket below) and service intensity (second curly 
bracket): 
$̂ $⁄  X
-..
./
YZ[
Z\$"#$ &  ̂  1 ( 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  ]$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Greater detail on the survival-model construction can be found at Basu & Manning (2010) and Federspiel 
et al. (2013). Marginal effects were bootstrapped using 5,000 replications to generate confidence 
intervals.  
Implementing IV 
Another key challenge to this research was possible selection bias due to unobservable 
differences between incident users of facility LTC and those who received community LTC. To address 
these concerns, we used IVs to account for potential bias due to unobservable differences in the two 
groups. Valid IVs should be associated with the “treatment” (here, use of LTC facility) but not otherwise 
associated with the outcome (Medicare expenditures). We proposed three IVs. First, number of children 
has been used as an instrument to predict the effect of informal caregiving (a type of community LTC) on 
healthcare use.98,99,100 Second, we considered local supply of LTC facilities, including ALFs and 
continuing care retirement communities (CCRC), and third, state-level spending on home-delivered meals 
(Meals on Wheels). These instruments should affect facility LTC service use but not healthcare use 
directly when controlling for local healthcare facility supply and state spending on home and community-
based services (HCBS).101  
Within the general framework of a survival-adjusted model, each model used IVs to adjust for 
unobserved confounding factors when comparing facility and community LTC users. The first stage 
predicted treatment (facility LTC, or FLTC) as a function of the IVs and X, a vector of the pre-disposing, 
enabling, and need characteristics listed in Table 4.1, using a probit model.  
 W  	
   	  W  	  W   W   
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The three second-stage models were estimated, predicting survival and Medicare expenditures. 
Due to non-linear models in the second stage and a discrete endogenous variable, the IV analysis 
required the use of a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) method,102 in which the residuals from the first 
stage were included, as well as the treatment of facility LTC (W, and other pre-disposing, enabling, 
and need characteristics () listed in Table 4.1.  
We implemented a 2SRI-based strategy, with two deviations from the typical approach. First, we 
used the residual in the probit space rather than the more common probability space, analogous to the 
inverse Mills ratio in a classic Heckman model103. Second, because collinearity between the residual and 
the covariates (mean variance inflation factor >10) led to poorly behaved estimation algorithms, we 
simulated the residual by conducting multiple replications with a random draw from the standard normal 
distribution consistent with the parameter estimates. See Appendix 1 for details. 
Data Source and Sample 
Information about individuals and their healthcare use came from the nationally representative 
2000–2009 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).104 Panels of beneficiaries are introduced 
annually and followed for four years. Information on LTC supply came from: (1) U.S. Census ZIP Code 
Business Patterns, which provided data on the local supply of LTC providers (CCRCs, ALFs, and NFs) in 
participants’ zip code area;105 (2) State Program Reports provided 2000–2009 state-level spending on 
home-delivered meals funded through Title III-C2 of the Older Americans Act of 1965, which we 
translated into per capita amounts for the over-65 population;106 and (3) Medicaid payment rates for NFs 
and percent of Medicaid spending on HCBS came from the Brown University LTCFocus Web site. For the 
survival-adjusted analytic method, data files were constructed such that observations were person-
months. Periods in our analysis were calendar months because the SSA-verified MCBS death date listed 
the calendar month of death.  
The retrospective study period was designed to have three periods (Figure 4.1): (1) a wash-out 
period that included an individual’s first three months in the survey, or January 1 to March 31 of Year 1; 
(2) the treatment window (April 1, Year 1, to March 31, Year 2); we included a second potential treatment 
window (April 1, Year 2, to March 31, Year 3) for those who were eligible for but did not use facility LTC 
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during the first treatment window; and (3) the outcome period started at the end of their treatment window 
and continued for a maximum 21 months—the outcome period was split into calendar months.  
The sample was created by matching incident facility LTC users (treatment group) to community 
LTC users (controls). Beneficiaries were eligible if they were ages 50 and older, entered the MCBS living 
in the community, did not use facility LTC during the wash-out period, and used community LTC or facility 
LTC during the treatment window. Other exclusion criteria included residence in Puerto Rico, missing 
number of adult children, or individuals who had only an SNF stay during the wash-out period (meaning 
their SNF stay began before the beginning of the wash-out period and ended after it, so we could not see 
whether they had previously lived in an LTC facility).  
Incident facility LTC use during a one-year treatment window constituted treatment (Figure 4.1). 
Incident facility use included a non-Medicare–paid stay in an NF or any stay in an ALF as indicated in the 
residence history file. Assisted living, board & care homes, domiciliary care facility, personal care 
facilities, rest homes, and adult/group homes were all considered ALFs.  
We matched each beneficiary receiving facility LTC to several similarly aged beneficiaries who 
received community LTC in the first treatment window (April 1, Year 1, to March 31, Year 2) and never 
went on to receive facility LTC. Community controls were age-matched to facility LTC users within three-
year age-bins at a ratio of three community LTC controls for each facility LTC recipient. Individuals were 
censored due to death, HMO enrollment, or end of survey participation. 
Measures 
Outcomes: Dependent variables were Medicare expenditures on inpatient or physician services in 
each calendar month, as well as survival. Monthly expenditures were calculated from Medicare claims. If 
a claim spanned more than one month, it was apportioned by the proportion of days that occurred within 
each month. Claims were converted to 2004 real dollars using the medical consumer price index,107 
because much LTCFocus data used 2004 dollars. Survival was constructed from the MCBS data, which 
offered the month in which death occurred. Each observation included an indicator of whether death 
occurred in the month or censoring (due to an end in their survey participation, previous death, or HMO 
enrollment). 
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Independent Variables: We included key pre-disposing, enabling, and need factors in our model 
(Table 4.1) that were expected to affect healthcare use.108 All individual-level covariates from the MCBS 
were measured in the fall before the wash-out and treatment windows that began the following spring. 
Supply characteristics came from the calendar year in which the treatment window started. 
4.3. Results 
The 3,330 beneficiaries in the sample were selected by age-matching incident facility LTC users 
(26%) with those who only used community LTC (74%) (Table 4.1). The average participant was an 82-
year-old unmarried white female with a high school education. Despite age-matching, facility LTC users 
had higher rates of Alzheimer’s Disease (p <.05) and lower rates of many cardiovascular diseases (p 
<.05) compared to community LTC users. Surprisingly, they also had a lower number of activities of daily 
living (ADLs) with which they needed assistance (p <.05), our primary measure of functional disability.  
Tests of Instruments and Endogeneity 
We tested the strength of the proposed IVs (F-test>10). Only number of adult children (F = 14.77) 
passed; all other potential IVs failed the individual test of strength, so all further tests and models were 
implemented using the one valid IV: number of adult children. 
Following a Modified Park test to identify the correct family distributions, we ran all second-stage 
expenditure models as generalized linear models using the log link and Poisson family. A modified 
Hausman test of the residual failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in any of the second-stage 
models (p >.05); however, potential measurement error may have biased the coefficient on the residual 
toward zero (See Appendix 1).  
To sensitivity test, we changed the model to run without diagnoses, married status, and ADLs (to 
simulate the selection effect, assuming those characteristics affect survival and expenditures). The 
coefficient on the residual remained non-significant in all three second-stage models, although point 
estimates changed. We further tested selection effects in the survival model using a bivariate probit with a 
dichotomous dependent variable of ever dying in the outcome period. Again, we failed to reject the null of 
no correlation of the error term in the survival model. 
To further test selection, we implemented the model as a two-stage predictor substitution with a 
first-stage linear probability model. This enabled us to test endogeneity using variants of the Hausman 
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run as an F-test on the coefficients on the: residual when it was included with facility LTC in the second 
stage; the predicted facility LTC use when it was included with true facility LTC use in the second stage; 
and the IV when it was included with true facility LTC use in the second stage. We failed to reject the null 
of exogeneity in the survival model. For inpatient expenditures, we failed to reject exogeneity in the 
expenditures conditional on survival model (p <.05) but rejected the null of exogeneity in the expenditures 
conditional on death model (p <.05). For physician expenditures, we failed to reject exogeneity in either 
expenditure model. Although we found quite limited evidence of endogeneity, to be conservative we 
implemented the models as IVs using 2SRI, although we present estimates from non-IV models for 
contrast below.  
Impact of Treatment on Survival 
Incident LTC facility use had a large and significant effect on cumulative survival in the outcome 
period (Figure 4.2). By month 20, incident facility LTC users had a cumulative survival rate of 55.2% (95% 
CI: 47.4%–61.2%) compared to 75.2% (95% CI: 73.0%–77.5%) in community LTC users (Figure 4.2). 
Estimates varied only slightly in the IV and non-IV models, suggesting that selection effects did not 
explain the large differences in survival across groups; sensitivity tests listed above confirmed this finding.  
Impact of Treatment on Medicare Inpatient Expenditures 
Incident facility LTC use had no significant total marginal effect on cumulative Medicare inpatient 
expenditures in IV models; however, there was a significant effect on spending due to differences in 
survival in the IV model (Figure 4.3). Higher mortality in the facility LTC group had mixed impacts of 
higher expenditures in early months, due to higher mortality and accompanying higher healthcare use in 
the month of death, followed by savings in later months due to those who die using no services after 
death. In early months (1–8), facility LTC use led to significantly higher cumulative expenditures due to 
survival differences; this effect disappeared by month 10. In the last 5 months, however, the lower 
cumulative survival rate among facility LTC users led to a decrease in expenditures among facility users 
(compared to community LTC users), ending with a significant cumulative decrease of $411 in the last 
month (Bias-corrected 95% CI: -$737 to -$192). Facility LTC had no significant effect on spending due to 
intensity of service use in the IV model (Figure 4.3). These results can be compared to the non-IV model, 
where there was a positive and significant total marginal effect of facility LTC and a positive marginal 
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effect due to differences in service intensity. These findings suggested that selection effects were 
responsible for some of the increased service use when alive.  
Impact of Treatment on Medicare Physician Expenditures 
Incident facility LTC use had a non-significant total marginal effect on cumulative Medicare 
expenditures for physician care (Figure 4.3). However, there was a significant effect on spending due to 
differences in survival (Figure 4.3). In early months (1–3), there was a positive significant marginal effect 
due to survival differences; by month 7, this effect became a negative significant marginal effect, ending 
with a significant cumulative effect of -$365 in the last month (Bias-corrected 95% CI: -$477 to -$99). 
There was no significant effect of facility LTC on spending due to intensity of service use (Figure 4.3). As 
with inpatient expenditures, the non-IV model showed a positive and significant total marginal effect of 
facility LTC and a positive marginal effect due to differences in service intensity, suggesting again that 
selection effects were responsible for some of the increased service use when alive 
4.4. Discussion 
Given the high use of LTC services by older Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities, 
understanding how facility LTC use affects Medicare expenditures for physician and inpatient services is 
critical to policymakers. Ours is the first study to examine this question since major policy changes were 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. Our study contributes several key findings. First, our findings did 
not support our hypothesis that current financial incentives faced by LTC facilities increased Medicare’s 
expenditures for hospitalization of facility LTC users relative to those receiving community LTC. This is 
consistent with the findings from demonstrations nearly thirty years ago that found no effect of NF 
admission on inpatient services109 despite large changes in the financial and policy context for LTC 
facilities during the intervening period. This study finds that in the general disabled older population, 
facility LTC did not increase or decrease Medicare expenditures on inpatient services compared to 
community LTC users.  
Second, we found no effect of facility LTC use on physician services expenditures. This is again 
consistent with prior demonstrations on delaying NF admissions and may, in part, reflect the role 
physicians play in NFs. Although research on physicians’ role and presence in NFs and ALFs offers 
limited insight into their availability and involvement, some prior evidence suggests that physicians have a 
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very limited presence in NFs.110,111 Even among the small proportion of primary care physicians that 
practice in NFs, little of their time is spent with NF patients.112,113  
Third, facility LTC’s effects on survival, through which facility LTC decreased expenditures on 
physician and inpatient services, were unexpected. Observational research has noted that facility LTC 
admission accelerates physical and/or cognitive decline in older adults.114,115 Descriptive research also 
suggests that NF residents die more quickly.116 A recent study that attempted to account for unobserved 
selection found at least some independent effect of NF use on mortality. Dementia patients admitted to 
NF in good health experienced higher mortality compared to similar individuals in the community.117 
Evidence presented here suggests some causal relationship between facility admission and increased 
mortality. Additional research that validates these relationships and investigates possible causal 
pathways will be important to understand whether this is an artifact of moving in a frail, older population or 
reflective of modifiable factors specific to the NF setting (e.g., differences in risk or treatment for 
infections, falls, emotional well-being).  
Limitations 
There are several limitations of our study, some of which apply to other exactly identified IV 
analyses. Although we believe our instrument (number of adult children) stands up to the exclusion 
restriction and has been used repeatedly as an instrument in similar studies, we were unable to test the 
instrument. Additionally, IV analyses reduce power, a trade-off in accounting for possible selection 
effects. Second, we conducted the analysis without sampling weights because: (1) survival-adjusted 
models have not been validated using weights and (2) we could not use the MCBS weights as provided in 
our sample, so we would have had to construct our own weights. Thus, our findings may not be nationally 
generalizable.118 Third, the beneficiaries using facility LTC included both ALF and NF residents. Many 
ALF residents transfer to NFs.119 Incident users of only ALFs (who did not go on to use another type of 
facility) constitute 19% of the facility LTC group. Evidence from admittedly small samples reflects that ALF 
and NF residents have similar outcomes with regard to mortality and functional decline.120 We felt that, 
given the incentives and similarity in the populations, it was appropriate to group ALF and NF users 
together, although estimates must be interpreted as local average effects for those entering both types of 
facility.  
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Implications for Policy and Practice  
Identifying opportunities for reducing Medicare expenditures in high-cost populations will be 
critical to cost-bending measures of the ACA. LTC facilities can influence their residents’ non-NF 
healthcare use and face ongoing incentives to increase some Medicare services. New financial 
relationships could change these incentives. ACOs and other new payment structures have created 
financial ties between LTC facilities and hospitals. Although these payments do not directly address LTC 
provision, they do create new and deeper ties among hospitals, doctors, and NFs (as well as ALFs, 
though they cannot explicitly join ACOs). Policymakers and providers should create payment mechanisms 
that reward LTC facilities that demonstrate the value of their services to Medicare.  
Equally important but less clear will be the role of community LTC providers in these new 
payment and delivery systems. It may be that we found no effect of facility LTC on expenditures, despite 
the incentives they face, because the diverse spectrum of community LTC providers are not integrated 
into the healthcare system and are not encouraged to avoid unnecessary healthcare use. Community 
LTC providers include a range of paid and unpaid workers. Though the proportion of individuals receiving 
paid community LTC increases steadily after age 60, the majority is provided by family members.121 In 
some cases, a patchwork of providers may struggle to meet the needs of declining older adults. In those 
cases, physician care and hospitalizations can become a stopgap for beneficiaries’ safety and well-being, 
leading to high healthcare use. This leaves community LTC recipients as critical targets for new capitated 
programs to reduce unnecessary healthcare use. Yet because of the decentralized nature of community 
LTC that can include family, neighbors, agencies, and independent paid caregivers, ACOs and other 
bundled payment systems may struggle to integrate community LTC providers. Smaller systems that 
successfully integrate the range of community LTC supports individuals receive, such as the Program of 
All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly, provide a window into the intensive coordination and close contact that 
this type of integration requires.122 
Our results illuminate the need for continued, rigorous research to inform health policy and cost-
reduction efforts. Specifically, our unexpected finding about higher mortality among facility LTC residents 
highlights the critical role that mortality plays in healthcare costs. Both policymakers and researchers 
must be aware of this competing risk when examining use and cost in medically vulnerable populations. 
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Additional research in this and other high-cost populations that incorporates the impacts of end-of-life and 
examines specific types of healthcare spending could help policymakers and providers understand where 
to target efforts. 
In conclusion, we found that incident facility LTC use did not alter Medicare expenditures on 
physician services or inpatient services relative to community LTC, despite some savings that accrued 
due to higher mortality among facility LTC users. Given our results, healthcare systems that seek to 
reduce hospitalization and other expenditures among disabled older adults must integrate the range of 
LTC providers, with no one type of LTC provider as “low hanging fruit,” to successfully reduce costs and 
improve quality in this vulnerable population. This is no easy task for busy healthcare providers. New 
capitated payment mechanisms that incentivize care coordination efforts may provide reasons and room 
for this type of LTC integration into healthcare delivery, long overdue in American health care.  
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Table 4.1. 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Medicare Beneficiaries Receiving LTC 
 
Community 
(N=2,466) 
Facility 
(N=864) 
 
 
Community 
(N=2,466) 
Facility 
(N=864) 
LTC Supply Interest Mean (SD) or Percentage 
 
Pre-disposing 
Characteristics Mean (SD) or Percentage 
Number Children*** 3.0 (2.3) 2.5 (2.1)  Age 82.3 (8.4) 82.3 (8.5) 
Assisted Living Facilities 1.2 (1.9) 1.2 (1.8)  Married*** 43.1% 28.9% 
CCRCs 0.4 (0.7) 0.4 (0.8)     
State Spending Delivered 
Meals 5.2 (2.0) 5.2 (2.1) 
 
Female 67.9% 67.1% 
State Medicaid NF Per 
Diem 149.3 (34.8) 150.5 (34.0) 
 African American***  13.6% 9% 
% Medicaid Spending on 
HCBS 25.3 (13.4) 24.3 (13.2) 
 
   
Enabling Characteristics Mean (SD) or Percentage 
 
Need Characteristics Mean (SD) or Percentage 
Education*    Functional Limitation   
Less than High 
School 48.8% 44.3% 
 Number of ADLs *** 2.4 (1.8) 1.7 (1.8) 
Some College 42.6% 45.1%  Cognitive Limitation 34.1% 34.4% 
College Graduate 8.6% 10.5%  Health Conditions   
Census Regions1 ***    Alzheimers** 11.1% 14.9% 
Mountain 6.5% 4.9%  Hip Fracture** 11.6% 8.2% 
Pacific 10.6% 8.9%  Diabetes* 26.0% 22.5% 
South Atlantic 22.4% 19.3%  Cancer 18.0% 17.2% 
Mountain Pacific 6.5% 4.9%  COPD/Emphysema** 17.6% 13.0% 
West South Central 10.9% 11.3%  Stroke* 26.5% 22.3% 
East South Central 9.3% 7.3%  MI 17.8% 17.5% 
West North Central 7.2% 10.3%  CHF 8.8% 7.9% 
East North Central 15.0% 20.1%  Arteriosclerosis* 13.8% 10.6% 
MidAtlantic 15.7% 15.0%  Arhythmia 13.7% 13.1% 
New England 2.3% 2.8%  Angina*** 14.4% 9.5% 
Rural    Hypertension** 64.3% 58.6% 
Urban 70.9% 68.6%     
Large Town 16.4% 16.7%     
Rural 12.7% 14.7%     
Any Medicaid Eligibility*** 25.6% 19.3%     
Notes: * indicated p<.05 , ** indicates p<.01, ***p<.001, 1 West includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington; 
Mountain includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; West South Central includes 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; East South Central includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; West North 
Central includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; East North Central includes Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; South Atlantic includes Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia; MidAtlantic includes New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; New England 
includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
  
 Figure 4.1. Study period made up of wash
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-out period, treatment windows, and outcome
 
 window. 
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Figure 4.2. Incident facility LTC effect on survival. 
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Figure 4.3. Incident facility LTC’s differential effect (facility LTC vs. community LTC) on Medicare 
expenditures for inpatient services. 
Positive values reflect higher expenditures for facility LTC users relative to community LTC users.  
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Figure 4.4. Incident facility LTC’s differential effect (facility LTC vs. community LTC) on Medicare 
expenditures for physician services. 
Positive values reflect higher expenditures for facility LTC users relative to community LTC users.  
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CHAPTER 5. AIM 2 
5.1. Introduction 
Medicare spending on sub-acute care, or nursing, rehabilitative, and similar services 
delivered outside acute-care hospitals, totaled approximately $60 billion in 2010.123 These services, 
including skilled nursing facility (SNF), home health, and hospice, are drivers of the increased 
healthcare expenditures among high-cost patients.124,125,126 Older, disabled Medicare beneficiaries 
are one such high-cost group.127,128,129,130,131,132  
In addition to sub-acute services, disabled older adults use long-term care (LTC) that assists 
them with activities of daily living (ADLs), such as bathing, eating, and dressing. LTC can be delivered 
in facilities, such as nursing facilities (NF) or assisted living facilities (ALF), or the community. LTC 
providers have frequent, often daily, contact with care recipients; this frequent contact translates to 
influence over residents’ healthcare use. Given this influence and continued concerns over growth in 
Medicare sub-acute spending, it is important for policymakers to better understand the relationship 
between LTC setting and sub-acute care.  
Perhaps crucial to this understanding is that current Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement 
policies create financial incentives for LTC facilities to increase one type of sub-acute care, skilled 
nursing facility (SNF) rehabilitative care. The Medicare SNF benefit entitles beneficiaries to up to 100 
days of Medicare-covered rehabilitative care in an SNF after hospitalizations (see Table 5.1). For 
NFs, the incentive to increase SNF care arises because the overwhelming majority of NFs provide 
both traditional LTC and SNF services. Though a single NF facility provides both SNF and LTC within 
the same building, these services differ in their primary goals (SNF care focused on improvement of 
functional status and health, LTC on maintenance) and staff skill level required. They also differ in the 
primary payer (Medicare covers SNF and Medicaid and private dollars pay for LTC). In the past 
twenty years, fiscal pressure on state Medicaid LTC budgets and resulting LTC payment cuts have 
pushed NFs to seek the substantially higher profit margins available for Medicare SNF services 
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relative to Medicaid and private-pay LTC.133,134,135,136 The higher profit margin for SNF care provided 
NFs with an incentive to increase SNF services for beneficiaries who live in and receive LTC from 
NFs. Although ALFs do not provide SNF care directly, they face similar incentives to encourage SNF 
use by their residents. ALFs usually require residents to continue payments if they are hospitalized or 
admitted to SNFs; when this occurs, ALFs receive payment but provide no services.  
Most research on the effects of LTC setting (facility versus community) to Medicare spending 
was conducted before the rapid growth in Medicare sub-acute care spending in the 1990s. For 
example, the Channeling Demonstration found no effect of delaying NF admission on Medicare costs 
in the 1980s.137 Informal care, one type of community LTC, was shown to reduce Medicare 
expenditures for SNF and home health in the early 1990s.138 Currently, Medicare and Medicaid 
policymakers are implementing changes to both the sub-acute market (e.g., bundling payments to 
providers) and LTC (e.g., increasing access to Medicaid-paid home and community-based services); 
therefore, updated evidence on the relationship between facility LTC and sub-acute service use is 
needed to inform policy on benefit structures and payment mechanisms.  
This study compared facility LTC versus community LTC’s effect on Medicare expenditures 
for certain sub-acute services—SNF, hospice, and home health—among older Medicare beneficiaries 
with disabilities from 2000–2009. We included certain sub-acute services in addition to SNF care 
because the Medicare cost implications of the SNF incentives could be negated if community LTC 
recipients are substituting other sub-acute services for SNF care. Alternatives for SNF care for 
patients needing skilled services outside an acute-care hospital setting include home health and 
hospice. These largely community-based sub-acute services have different eligibility criteria but can 
act as substitutes for one another or for SNF care for some patients (see Table 5.1). These three 
types of sub-acute services (SNF, hospice, and home health) are also among the largest segments of 
Medicare spending.139 Due to the incentives discussed earlier, we hypothesized that individuals 
receiving facility LTC would have higher Medicare expenditures for sub-acute care than those 
receiving community LTC. 
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5.2. Methods 
The high mortality among disabled older adults and the use of sub-acute services at the end-
of-life140,141 required an approach that could illuminate whether LTC setting affects healthcare use 
through mortality risks, which could increase or decrease healthcare use. Additionally, community 
and facility LTC users may have unobservable characteristics that affect their sub-acute healthcare 
use (e.g., patient acuity). To address these issues, we tested our hypothesis using an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach within a survival-adjusted model. 
Survival-Adjusted Model Construction 
Survival-adjusted methods allow us to estimate a total effect of facility LTC on sub-acute 
expenditures, composed of partial effects due to either survival differences or the rates of cost-
accumulation when alive (“service intensity”). To do this, we estimated three different models as a 
function of treatment (t) and a vector of other covariates (x): (1) a survival model for all person-
periods in which the beneficiary survived and was not censored estimated using discrete-time survival 
methods and a probit model, which generated a hazard function for death h et, x and the predicted 
probability of survival Set, x; (2) a generalized linear model predicting expenditures 
µiet, x conditional on death in the period; and (3) a generalized linear model estimating expenditures 
µiet, x conditional on survival in the period. A modified Park Test identified the correct family in the 
generalized linear models. 
In the survival-adjusted model, the estimated Medicare expenditures in a given period for any 
individual was the weighted sum of the expenditures conditional on survival to that period and death 
in that period or µi e  SeX  & h eX  µiejX   1 ( h eX  µieXk) with the total estimated expenditure 
over the period ̂ as the sum of the period-specific estimate. The marginal effect of a covariate X 
(such as facility LTC) on µi e can be viewed as the total treatment effect (below) or, as mentioned, it 
can be decomposed into an effect on expenditures due to survival differences (first curly bracket 
below) and an effect on expenditures due to service intensity (second curly bracket): 
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∂µi ∂T⁄  X ]b∂SeX∂X &h eX  µieX  1 ( h eX  µieX)  SeX  ]∂h eX∂X  8µieX ( µieX9^c
n
e,
  bSeX ]h eX  ∂µieX∂X   81 ( h eX9   ∂µieX∂X  ^c^ 
Greater detail on the survival-adjusted model construction can be found at Basu & 
Manning142 and Federspiel et al143. Marginal effects were bootstrapped using 5,000 replications to 
generate confidence intervals (CI).  
Implementing Instrumental Variables 
To account for possible unobservable differences between incident facility LTC and 
community LTC users that could bias estimates, we used an IV approach. This required us to identify 
covariates that would predict treatment but not the outcome of interest (sub-acute expenditures) after 
controlling for observable characteristics. Based on previous literature, our proposed instruments 
include the number of adult children,144,145 local supply of LTC facilities, and state funding for home-
delivered meals.146 
The first-stage model was run as a probit model predicting incident use of facility LTC (FLTCer 
as a function of the instrument and X, a vector of the predisposing, enabling, and need characteristics 
in Table 5.2.  
FLTC er  β
   β  Instrumentser  β  Xer   εer  
The three second-stage models estimated either survival or sub-acute expenditures. Due to 
non-linear second-stage models, implementing the IV model required a two-stage residual inclusion 
(2SRI) approach.147 In 2SRI, residuals from the first stage are included with the treatment and other 
predisposing, enabling, and need characteristics (X). Our 2SRI-based strategy deviated from the 
typical approach of 2SRI in two ways. First, we used the residual from the probit space rather than 
the probability space, more analogous to the inverse Mills ratio in a classic Heckman model.148 
Second, due to collinearity between the residual and the covariates (mean variance inflation factor 
>10), we simulated the residual by conducting multiple replications with a random draw from the 
standard normal distribution consistent with the parameter estimates (see Appendix 2). 
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Data Sources 
Information about individuals, their use of facility or community LTC, and their sub-acute 
Medicare expenditures came from the 2000–2009 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS).149 
LTC supply came from the U.S. Census ZIP Code Business Patterns, which provided zip code–level 
counts of continuing care retirement communities (CCRCs), ALFs, and NFs.150 Data derived from the 
2000–2009 State Program Reports provided state-level spending on home-delivered meals funded 
through Title III-C2 of the Older Americans Act of 1965, which we translated into per capita amounts 
for the over 65 population.151 Medicaid payment rates for NFs and percent of Medicaid spending on 
home and community-based services (HCBS) came from the Brown University LTCFocus Web site. 
Using these sources, we constructed an analytic file with person-month combinations. Each 
observation included an indicator of censoring (due to the end of their survey panel, death, or HMO 
enrollment) and an indicator of death in the month. 
Sample Construction and Treatment 
The retrospective study period was designed to have three periods: (1) a wash-out period 
covering an individual’s first three months in the survey, or January 1 to March 31 of Year 1, during 
which eligible individuals had no facility LTC use; (2) a treatment window (April 1 Year 1 to March 31, 
Year 2) during which incident facility LTC or community LTC alone could occur. We included a 
second potential treatment window (April 1, Year 2, to March 31, Year 3) for those who were eligible 
for but did not use facility LTC during the first treatment window; and (3) an outcome period, split into 
calendar months, starting at the end of an individual’s treatment window and continuing for a 
maximum 21 months.  
As discussed, the sampling frame included individuals who entered the MCBS living in the 
community and did not use facility LTC during the wash-out period, with a few additional exclusion 
criteria. We excluded individuals who either were under the age of 50, entered a mental health or 
psychiatric center or residence for the care of the mentally retarded/developmentally disabled at any 
point, had missing information on the number of adult children, or if they lived in Puerto Rico. 
Treatment was defined as incident LTC facility use (moving into an LTC facility) during the 
treatment period and included a non-Medicare–paid stay in a NF or any stay in an ALF. Assisted 
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living, board & care homes, domiciliary care facility, personal care facilities, rest homes, and 
adult/group homes were all considered ALFs. A Medicare-paid SNF stay alone, without private or 
Medicaid-paid facility LTC use, did not constitute treatment. Eligible controls were selected from those 
who received community LTC during the first treatment window and never went on to have a 
Medicaid or private-pay LTC facility stay. Community controls were age-matched to facility LTC users 
within three-year age-bins at a 3:1 ratio.  
Measures 
Outcomes: Dependent variables included survival and Medicare expenditures on SNF, home 
health, and hospice in each calendar month. Survival was constructed from MCBS data, which 
provided the end date of the month in which death occurred. Expenditures were calculated from 
claims. The sum of Medicare expenditures on SNF, home health, and hospice were aggregated for 
each calendar month. We divided claims that spanned more than one month by the proportion of 
days that occurred within that month. Claims that began after death were assumed to be errors and 
excluded from analyses. Expenditures were converted to 2004 real dollars using the medical 
consumer price index.152 
Instruments: Number of adult children was self-reported from the fall prior to the treatment 
window. Number of CCRCs and ALFs were zip code–level counts. State-level spending on the Older 
Americans Act home-delivered meals was translated to per capita amounts for the over-65 
population.  
Covariates: Key predisposing, enabling, and need factors153 were taken from the fall prior to 
the treatment window. These included LTC supply, demographic characteristics, geographic groups 
including census region and rurality using zip code–assigned RUCA codes, self-reported diagnoses, 
a measure of cognitive limitation from survey responses, and ADLs (see Table 5.2 for full list).  
5.3. Results 
Of the 3,330 beneficiaries in the sample, 26% were incident facility LTC users and 74% used 
only community LTC. The average participant was an 82-year-old unmarried white female with a high 
school education (Table 5.2). Despite age-matching, community LTC users had higher rates of many 
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cardiovascular diseases (p<.05) whereas facility LTC users had higher rates of Alzheimer’s disease 
(p<.05). Surprisingly, community LTC users had more limitations in ADLs than facility users (p<.05).  
Tests of Instruments and Endogeneity 
Number of adult children was the only instrument to meet the test of strength (F statistic >10) 
in the first stage (F=14.77). All further tests were implemented using this instrument. Following a 
Modified Park test to identify the correct distribution family for the generalized linear model, both 
second-stage expenditure models were run as generalized linear models with a log link and Poisson 
family. We conducted a range of different tests of endogeneity for each of the three second-stage 
models, including a bivariate probit for the survival model and variations of the Hausman test, in 
which we ran the IV models as two-stage predictor substitution and linear probability models. We 
found no evidence of selection effects impacting the survival model but found mixed evidence for 
selection effects in the two expenditure models. Due to the mixed findings around selection, we 
implemented all models as 2SRI IV models. 
Impact of Treatment on Survival 
Incident facility use had a large and significant effect on cumulative survival during the 
outcome period (Figure 5.1). By month 20, incident facility LTC users had a cumulative survival rate 
of 55.2% (95% CI: 47.4%–61.2%) compared to 75.2% (95% CI: 73.0%–77.5%) among community 
LTC users (Figure 5.1). Estimates varied only slightly in the IV and non-IV models, suggesting that 
selection effects had little impact on survival (which was confirmed in multiple tests).  
Effect of Facility LTC on Medicare Sub-acute Expenditures 
There was a significant total marginal effect of facility LTC on sub-acute expenditures (see 
Figure 5.2), though the statistical significance of the effect disappeared in month 7 (cumulative effect 
on expenditures was $678 in month 6 with a bias-corrected 95% CI of $12–$1,317). This significant 
total increase in early months was largely due to increased intensity of service use when individuals 
were alive. The cumulative effect of facility LTC on service intensity was $2,833 (bias-corrected 95% 
CI of $408–$4,991) by month 21. However, the higher mortality among facility LTC users decreased 
expenditures significantly (-$1,083 cumulative effect in month 21), because individuals were more 
likely to have died as time passed and savings accrued. The combination of these countervailing 
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effects of facility LTC (increasing service intensity when alive but higher mortality inadvertently saving 
money as time passes) resulted in the non-significant total marginal effect in later months. 
5.4. Discussion 
We examined whether facility LTC use increased Medicare expenditures for certain sub-
acute services (SNF, hospice, and home health) for one group of high-cost Medicare beneficiaries—
disabled older adults. Our findings suggest that incident facility LTC increased Medicare expenditures 
on these sub-acute services relative to community LTC, although these higher expenditures were 
mediated by higher mortality in LTC facility users (which reduced costs over time). These findings are 
consistent with Van Houtven and Norton’s findings that one type of community LTC, informal 
caregiving, reduced home health and SNF use.154 However, our findings also provide insights into the 
pathways through which facility LTC affects expenditures: intensity of sub-acute use and survival 
effects.  
Our findings suggest that facility LTC increased sub-acute service intensity when residents 
were alive. This increase may have resulted from current financial incentives regarding 
reimbursement (higher margins on SNF versus LTC among NFs; lower costs of care for ALFs while 
patients are receiving SNF care). Alternatively, our findings may be tied to the construction of benefits 
and facility LTC users’ home health and hospice use. For example, NF residents can only receive 
rehabilitative care from more expensive SNFs because Medicare benefits do not allow home health 
agencies to deliver services to NF residents (and hospice benefits do not cover rehabilitation). 
Additionally, although hospice use in NFs is increasing, NF residents are more likely to use SNF 
benefits instead of hospice at the end-of-life.155 This may also be due to benefit construction. Hospice 
benefits do not cover NF room and board, whereas the Medicare SNF benefit does. Thus, permanent 
NF residents receiving hospice have to pay out-of-pocket or have Medicaid pay their room and board, 
whereas those receiving SNF have Medicare cover their room and board. As a result, Medicare 
beneficiaries living in a NF may prefer to receive the SNF benefits over hospice. 
We also found that facility LTC increased mortality, which decreased cumulative expenditures 
on sub-acute care over the outcome period. This higher mortality among facility LTC users began to 
offset increased expenditures due to service intensity, rendering a non-significant total effect on 
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Medicare expenditures in later months. To date, most work suggesting facility LTC increases mortality 
has been observational and attributed largely to increased frailty in this population,156,157,158 although 
at least one study found some independent effect of NF use on survival.159 The use of an IV suggests 
at least some causal relationship between incident facility LTC and increased mortality. Recent 
research has shown that facility LTC residents have a higher number of transitions from hospital and 
SNF compared to community residents, though this work did not account for selection effects.160 If 
facility LTC increases the number of transitions (which would be consistent with the higher 
expenditures found here), it may be that transitions create more opportunities for failures in care 
coordination and a risk for poor outcomes, including mortality.161 Additional research is needed to 
discover the reasons for the higher mortality and what role, if any, higher use of sub-acute care 
played in higher mortality for facility LTC recipients. 
Limitations 
We note several limitations. First, there may be differences in unobserved characteristics 
between community LTC and facility LTC users. The use of IV should address some of these 
concerns. However, because the IV was exactly identified, we were unable to test whether the 
instrument fails the exclusion restriction. Fortunately, number of adult children has been shown to be 
a valid instrument among older adults (those using LTC).162 Second, we did not use sampling weights 
due to complexities of the modeling effort and the longitudinal sample construction from multiple 
waves of the MCBS. Thus, the analysis presented here may not be nationally generalizable.163 Third, 
the sub-acute services modeled here (SNF, home health, hospice) can act as substitutes for certain 
patients but have important differences among them and their potential patient populations. To 
address these concerns, we ran a sensitivity analysis of estimating only SNF services as the 
dependent variable and inferences remained the same, suggesting that the effect of facility LTC lies 
primarily with use of SNF services. Finally, we did not include services such as long-term acute care 
hospitals or inpatient rehab facilities in the dependent variable. Because these services generally 
serve a small subset of complex patients with highly acute needs, the degree to which these services 
are substitutable for SNF, hospice, and home health, the highest cost-growth sub-acute care areas,164 
is limited among the general older disabled population.  
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Implications for Policy and Practice 
Our findings should be useful to policymakers as they structure new payment mechanisms 
that target facility LTC residents. In particular, payment reforms currently being implemented in the 
ACA seek to control Medicare sub-acute expenditures by improving care coordination. For example, 
the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative strives to integrate providers across the 
Medicare spectrum (including many sub-acute providers) through payments for episodes of care. 
Evaluations of these initiatives should examine their effectiveness for patients in LTC facilities, 
because our findings suggest that these beneficiaries have higher sub-acute costs. Most NFs provide 
both skilled and residential LTC but serve a minority of Medicare SNF patients relative to overall 
patient mix; a small subset of NFs serve a much higher proportion of SNF patients relative to overall 
patient days and these tend to be for-profit and/or hospital-based.165 If most NF providers are 
providing relatively little SNF care and, as a result, are less affected by bundled payment incentives, 
bundling payments may not impact sub-acute expenditures for the broader facility LTC population. 
Our findings may also have implications for improving benefit designs so that disabled 
beneficiaries are matched with appropriate but less costly sub-acute care. Given our findings, LTC 
facility residents are appropriate targets for these efforts. It is acknowledged that, in addition to 
incentives to increase SNF use, incentives exist for long hospice stays for NF residents, which may or 
may not be appropriate.166 Interest in financing a new hospice benefit for NF residents that includes a 
bundled payment for all post-acute, hospice, and long-term care could be part of an effort to 
incentivize providers to match patients with the appropriate sub-acute care.167 If LTC facilities and 
beneficiaries could gain by substituting appropriate hospice care for SNF care, and do so at a lower 
cost than SNF care, new NF-specific hospice benefit designs could decrease total Medicare 
expenditures. Another way to achieve this goal is through general efforts to incentivize healthcare 
providers (including LTC) to integrate LTC and healthcare delivery. Payment reforms to accomplish 
this, including changes to the physician fee schedule (to incentivize care coordination efforts) or 
federalizing all benefits for dual eligibles, could enable their success. These may help match 
necessary sub-acute care to the right patient.  
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Finally, policies to increase Medicaid-financed home and community-based services (HCBS) 
should consider their impact on Medicare sub-acute expenditures. Recent research on dual eligibles 
suggests that hospitalization rates may rise when individuals are transferred to the community.168 Our 
study broadens the lens to consider the impact of HCBS expansion on mortality and certain sub-
acute service use. If indeed there are potential savings for Medicare that could result from shifting 
Medicaid funding toward HCBS, CMS should consider overall Medicaid and Medicare costs and the 
exploding sub-acute expenditures in the calculus of access to community-based LTC. Regardless of 
its exact form, continued integration of LTC and health care should be a focus for Medicare cost 
containment among the LTC population.  
 
Table 5.1. 
Medicare Sub-Acute Benefits 
Medicare 
Benefit Eligibility Restrictions 
Services 
Covered 
Covered  
for NF 
residents? 
Covered  
for ALF 
Residents? 
Skilled 
Nursing 
Facility 
Patients in need of skilled nursing or 
rehabilitative care within 30 days of a 3-
day inpatient stay 
skilled nursing, 
physical therapy, 
speech-language 
pathology, 
occupational 
therapy, 
medications, 
dietary 
counseling, and 
medical social 
services 
Yes Yes 
Home 
Health 
home bound individuals who need skilled 
care on a part-time basis (skilled nursing 
care that’s needed or given on fewer than 
7 days each week or less than 8 hours 
each day over a period of 21 days or less)  
skilled nursing, 
home health aide, 
physical therapy, 
speech-language 
pathology, 
occupational 
therapy, and 
medical social 
services 
No Yes, though 
with 
important 
anti-kickback 
provisions 
Hospice certified as having six or less months to 
live  
All services 
related to terminal 
illness, but not 
room and board 
Yes Yes 
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Table 5.2. 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample of LTC Users by Setting of LTC 
 Community 
(N=2,466) 
Facility 
(N=864) 
 
 Community 
(N=2,466) 
Facility 
(N=864) 
LTC Supply Interest Mean (SD) or Percentage 
 
Pre-disposing 
Characteristics 
Mean (SD) or 
Percentage 
Number Children*** 3.0 (2.3) 2.5 (2.1)  Age 82.3 (8.4) 82.3 (8.5) 
Assisted Living Facilities 1.2 (1.9) 1.2 (1.8)  Married*** 43.1% 28.9% 
CCRCs 0.4 (0.7) 0.4 (0.8)     
State Spending Delivered 
Meals 5.2 (2.0) 5.2 (2.1) 
 
Female 67.9% 67.1% 
State Medicaid NF Per Diem 149.3 (34.8) 150.5 (34.0)  African American***  13.6% 9% 
% Medicaid Spending on 
HCBS 25.3 (13.4) 24.3 (13.2) 
 
   
Enabling 
Characteristics 
Mean (SD) or Percentage 
 
Need Characteristics Mean (SD) or 
Percentage 
Education*    Functional Limitation   
Less than High School 48.8% 44.3%  Number of ADLs *** 2.4 (1.8) 1.7 (1.8) 
Some College 42.6% 45.1%  Cognitive Limitation 34.1% 34.4% 
College Graduate 8.6% 10.5%  Health Conditions   
Census Regions***    Alzheimers** 11.1% 14.9% 
Mountain 6.5% 4.9%  Hip Fracture** 11.6% 8.2% 
Pacific 10.6% 8.9%  Diabetes* 26.0% 22.5% 
South Atlantic 22.4% 19.3%  Cancer 18.0% 17.2% 
West South Central 10.9% 11.3%  COPD/Emphysema** 17.6% 13.0% 
East South Central 9.3% 7.3%  Stroke* 26.5% 22.3% 
West North Central 7.2% 10.3%  MI 17.8% 17.5% 
East North Central 15.0% 20.1%  CHF 8.8% 7.9% 
MidAtlantic 15.7% 15.0%  Arteriosclerosis* 13.8% 10.6% 
New England 2.3% 2.8%  Arhythmia 13.7% 13.1% 
Rural    Angina*** 14.4% 9.5% 
Urban 70.9% 68.6%  Hypertension** 64.3% 58.6% 
Large Town 16.4% 16.7%     
Rural 12.7% 14.7%     
Any Medicaid Eligibility*** 25.6% 19.3%     
West includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington; Mountain includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; West South Central includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; East South 
Central includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; West North Central includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; East North Central includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; 
South Atlantic includes Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, 
West Virginia; MidAtlantic includes New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; New England includes Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
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Figure 5.1. Incident facility LTC effect on survival. 
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Figure 5.2. Incident facility LTC’s differential effect on Medicare sub-acute expenditures.  
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CHAPTER 6. AIM 3 
6.1. Introduction 
Hospital readmissions are costly to Medicare and may be an indicator of poor quality care 
during the hospital stay, at discharge, or post-discharge.169 As a result, hospital readmissions have 
become a central focus of Medicare cost containment and quality improvement efforts. Hospitalized 
disabled older adults are at increased risk of readmission.170,171 This may be because individuals who 
need post-discharge long-term care (LTC) face different risk factors for readmission than individuals 
who do not need LTC. Failure to meet patients’ LTC needs could exacerbate a fragile health state by 
creating a risk for falls, infections, or malnourishment.  
Alternatively, a patient’s post-discharge dependence on LTC providers may create other risks 
for readmission, because LTC providers may have their own financial and clinical motivations that 
influence subsequent admission decisions. LTC providers are largely paid or unpaid caregivers who 
help community-dwelling individuals with activities of daily living (ADLs), most often in patients’ 
homes (“community LTC”).172 A minority of LTC providers are LTC facilities, including assisted living 
facilities (ALFs) or nursing facilities (NFs). Some research suggests that receiving facility LTC prior to 
hospital admission increases risk of hospital readmission. For example, observational research from 
2006 showed that stays in an NF before a hospitalization increased the risk for subsequent 
readmission by approximately 3%.173  
Possible explanations for the increased readmission risk among facility LTC residents are 
complex and multi-faceted. Facility LTC residents are likely frailer and older than the general 
population, which could complicate their care needs and risk for readmission regardless of LTC 
setting. However, there are several potential pathways through which facility LTC use might 
compound the general risk of readmission for frail, older adults. First, exposure to multiple settings of 
care and associated poor care coordination could contribute to readmission. Individuals living in LTC 
facilities, particularly NFs, report a low-touch relationship with physicians.174,175 Additionally, 
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observational research suggests that NF residents are more likely to transition across multiple 
settings of care.176 If no single provider manages the patient across settings of care (NF facility, 
hospital, and then post-hospital destination), this could create a risk of readmission.  
Second, financial incentives for LTC facilities may increase risk of readmission for their 
residents. For example, qualitative research suggests liability is a major driver of hospitalizations from 
LTC facilities.177 Additionally, financial incentives may shape LTC facility practice patterns around 
hospitalization. Many Medicaid programs pay NFs a per diem to hold beds when Medicaid-covered 
residents are hospitalized. When Medicaid bed-hold policies are in place, they increase readmission 
rates even for NF patients who are not eligible for the bed-hold payments due to “spillover effects” in 
NF hospitalization practices.178 ALFs face similar incentives to increase hospital admissions and 
readmissions because they require continued rent during hospitalization.  
Finally, readmissions for facility LTC residents may be related to patients’ preferences. 
Individuals living in an NF before a hospitalization may want to return to the same NF for their 
rehabilitation care, regardless of whether that NF has expertise in the specific services they need. 
Though most NFs provide both post-hospital SNF rehabilitation care and LTC, there is variation in the 
mix of care NFs provide. Some NFs provide a majority of rehabilitation care (particularly hospital-
based SNFs)179 and patients discharged to SNFs that care primarily for rehabilitation patients tend to 
have lower rates of readmission.180 If patients prefer to be discharged to their prior facility regardless 
of its experience in providing rehabilitation care, this may put prior facility LTC residents at greater 
risk of readmission.  
To date, limited research has examined whether any increased risk in readmission among 
those in facility LTC is due to higher frailty and acuity alone or prior facility LTC use has an 
independent role in readmission risk. Given the financial implications of readmission to Medicare (and 
to providers and other payers as new payment programs are being implemented), we sought to 
examine whether facility LTC increased readmissions for Medicare beneficiaries from 2000 to 2009 
relative to community LTC, controlling for clinical and unobservable characteristics. 
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6.2. Methods 
Data Sources 
Survey and claims data came from the 2000–2009 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 
(MCBS).181 LTC supply came from the U.S. Census ZIP Code Business Patterns. Data derived from 
the 2000–2009 State Program Reports provided state-level spending on Title III-C2 of the Older 
Americans Act of 1965.182 State-level funding of LTC came from the Brown University LTCFocus Web 
site.  
Sample Construction 
The study period for each individual in the data between 2000 and 2009 was divided into 
three periods: (1) wash-out period; (2) one-year treatment window during which individuals used 
either facility LTC or community LTC; and (3) outcome period, during which eligible discharges could 
occur. Because we sought to identify individuals at risk of facility LTC but who could use community 
LTC, the sampling frame of individuals included those who used no facility LTC during the wash-out 
period and then received either facility LTC or community LTC during the treatment window.  
The sample was constructed with observations as discharges. Hospital admissions of 50-
year-old and older beneficiaries that occurred during the outcome window for all treated (incident LTC 
facility use) and control (community LTC use) individuals, as defined in the next section, were eligible 
for inclusion. Each observation had indicators for either 30- or 60-day readmissions.  
Measures 
We defined both index admissions and readmissions using the Yale Hospital-Wide All-Cause 
Unplanned Readmission measure.183 This used the AHRQ Clinical Classification Software grouping 
of ICD-9 codes. Index admissions that were eligible for a potential readmission included all 
discharges except direct transfers to other acute care hospitals, discharges against medical advice, 
cancer management treatment without a surgical procedure during the admission, psychiatric 
condition as the primary diagnosis, stays for rehabilitation fitting of prostheses and adjustment 
devices, or admissions in which the individual enrolled in an HMO or rolled off the MCBS survey 
within 30 or 60 days of the initial discharge. 
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Our primary outcome, hospital readmission, included all hospitalizations unless they either 
were planned or stays for cancer management treatment without a surgical procedure, psychiatric 
conditions, or rehabilitation fitting of prostheses and adjustment devices. We included separate 
indicators for readmissions that occurred within 30 or 60 days of discharge from the index admission.  
We also included indicators on index admissions if an individual died within either the 30- or 
60-day readmission window. Death was taken from proxy-reported death date. The MCBS also 
provides the Social Security Administration (SSA)–verified calendar month of death. In cases where 
the proxy-reported and SSA-verified month of death did not coincide, we conducted sensitivity tests 
by excluding these individuals.  
The main exposure was LTC setting. We defined treatment as incident LTC facility use during 
the one-year treatment window. Incident LTC facility use included a non-Medicare paid stay in an NF 
or any stay in an ALF. Assisted living, board & care homes, domiciliary care facilities, personal care 
facilities, rest homes, and adult/group homes were all considered ALFs. A Medicare-paid SNF stay 
alone, without an accompanying private or Medicaid-paid facility LTC use, did not constitute 
treatment. Control discharges were selected from those who received community LTC during the first 
treatment window and never went on to receive facility LTC.  
We identified covariates a priori (Table 6.1). LTC supply characteristics such as counts of 
ALFs and Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRC) in the individual’s zip code and state-
level funding for LTC were drawn from the year in which the treatment window began. Number of 
adult children and all other individual-level characteristics, including most pre-disposing, enabling, 
and need characteristics, were measured in the fall prior to the treatment window to limit endogeneity. 
We constructed the Charlson Comorbidity Index from the index admission’s discharge data.184  
Analytical Methods 
Because individuals who use facility LTC may have unobservable characteristics that affect 
both LTC setting and risk of readmission (such as frailty, etc.), we used an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach to adjust for selection effects. Valid IVs should predict the treatment (facility versus 
community LTC) but not the outcome of interest (hospital readmission) after controlling for observable 
characteristics. Based on previous literature, we considered as potential IVs three LTC supply 
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measures: number of adult children,185,186 local number of LTC facilities, and state funding for home-
delivered meals187. After predicting treatment in a probit model, we included the residual from this first 
stage in the second-stage logistic regression predicting likelihood of readmission.188 We bootstrapped 
our marginal effects, calculated using the method of recycled predictions, in 5,000 replications to 
generate confidence intervals (CI).  
We conducted sensitivity tests to examine whether excluding those who died would bias our 
estimates. This involved one model in which we excluded those who died within 30 or 60 days 
respectively and one in which we ran a composite measure of likelihood of death or readmission 
within 30 or 60 days. We also tested whether including ALF and NF in one treatment was biasing 
estimates by running one model in which we excluded individuals who received facility LTC only in an 
ALF and did not go on to live in an NF. We also ran alternative models with non-ideal specifications, 
including the model run as a linear probability model and two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS), to 
test selection effects. 
6.3. Results 
The descriptive statistics for discharges (not persons) eligible for a 30-day readmission are 
presented in Table 6.1. Of the 2,704 admissions, 48 were censored within 30 days of discharge due 
to HMO enrollment or survey roll-off and 408 died within 30 days of discharge, leaving a sample of 
2,248. The sample of 60-day readmissions is slightly smaller than the sample presented below due to 
greater censoring (HMO enrollment or death). The sample in Table 6.1 reflected some expected 
differences, with facility LTC users being older and less like to be married than community LTC users. 
However, the sample of community LTC users had an unexpectedly higher level of baseline disability.  
Tests of Instruments and Selection 
The number of adult children was the only instrument to pass tests of strength (F-test >10). In 
both the 30- and 60-day readmission models, the Hausman test on the residual failed to reject the 
null of exogeneity. In further sensitivity analyses, we ran readmission as bivariate probit models and 
found no evidence of selection (rho not significantly different from 0) and a non-significant effect of 
treatment on likelihood of 30-day or 60-day readmission. We also implemented the model as a 2SPS 
to test selection and inference and found no evidence of selection. However, given the study goals of 
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identifying the independent effect of facility LTC, we ran the models as IVs as the preferred approach 
to be conservative. 
Effect of LTC Setting on Readmissions 
In the IV models, previous incident facility LTC use had a non-significant differential effect on 
likelihood of either a 30-day readmission (bias-corrected 95% CI: -.16 to .60) (Figure 6.1) or a 60-day 
readmission (bias-corrected 95% CI: -.33 to .36) (Figure 6.2). The non-IV models also showed a non-
significant differential effect on likelihood of a 30-day readmission and 60-day readmission. The 
results remained the same when conflicting reports of death date were excluded from the analysis. 
We ran a sensitivity test in which we modeled death and readmission as a composite dependent 
variable, but the effect of LTC setting remained non-significant. Finally, the effect of facility LTC 
remained non-significant when we excluded from the treatment group those who used only ALF care.  
6.4. Discussion 
Previous observational research suggested that setting of LTC affected the likelihood of 
hospitalizations and readmissions. An observational study of Medicare-covered SNF stays showed 
that NF residence before the index hospital admission increased the risk of hospital readmission.189 
Among those dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, potentially avoidable hospitalizations were 
higher among NF residents compared to community residents.190 However, in another study in which 
propensity scores were used to create comparable groups among dual eligibles, community LTC 
increased the risk of hospitalization relative to NF residence, which researchers attributed to the 
difficulties of closely monitoring individuals in the community.191 In contrast to either of these findings, 
our research found that previous LTC setting (facility versus community) did not affect readmission 
(Figure 6.3), neither in models that treat prior facility use as exogenous nor those that controlled for 
unobserved sources of endogeneity. 
The differences between previous studies and ours could be explained by our controlling for 
the increased frailty or other unobservable differences associated with facility LTC use. If so, prior 
studies’ reported differences in readmission may be attributable to unobserved differences among 
those who use community LTC versus NFs. Although our tests for selection effects were largely null, 
these tests are low powered and do not conclusively resolve whether selection effects were present. 
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As such, accounting for unobservable characteristics may still be important, although our non-IV 
models also showed non-significant effects of LTC setting. An alternative explanation for our findings 
is that prior facility LTC use occurred much before the index admission and thus had little impact on 
later readmission risk. The study design (including identification of a wash-out period and a priori 
treatment window) was intended to identify those at risk of facility LTC use and thus create as 
comparable a group of treated and controls as possible; however, it may be that facility LTC use 
occurred too far before the index admission, with more impactful experiences in the interim such as a 
health event that altered LTC need or change in living situation. Alternative study designs, such as 
looking at the LTC setting (community versus facility) immediately prior to the index admission, may 
suggest a greater role for LTC setting but would likely struggle to identify facility LTC users who could 
receive LTC in the community, the population most likely to be influenced by LTC policy-making. 
Yet another alternative explanation for the difference in findings is that, in this population, 
readmission risk is more a function of the setting of care that someone is discharged to, rather than 
admitted from.192, 193 That prior facility LTC did not affect readmission may suggest that heterogeneity 
in discharge destination in our sample was greater than we expected. We had imagined that previous 
LTC might affect discharge destination, which was a possible causal pathway through which previous 
facility LTC use increased risk of readmission. If (1) individuals previously in an NF are likely to desire 
to return to that NF for SNF care and (2) risk of readmission increases when individuals are 
discharged to facilities that provide less SNF care, then readmission risk would be compounded 
because facility LTC residents may be more likely to return to their previous NF, which may not have 
expertise in rehab care.194 However, some community LTC users are likely using SNF rehabilitation 
care and some facility LTC users may be going to other facilities for rehab care after the index 
admission, which would dilute the influence of prior LTC facility residence and could explain the 
results presented here. Future research that investigates how prior LTC setting affects post-discharge 
destination and subsequent risk of readmission may be helpful to efforts to better understand the 
observed risk of readmission among LTC facility users. 
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Limitations 
There are several limitations to our study. First, the relatively small sample size combined 
with our use of an IV reduced our power to detect differences. Second, because only one IV passed 
tests of strength, we were unable to fully test instrument validity, though number of adult children has 
been used in similar studies.195 Third, the samples of community LTC and facility LTC users differed 
in unexpected ways, particularly the higher level of disability among community LTC users. This may 
reflect that incident facility LTC users experienced a sudden health crisis (hip fracture, etc.) that drove 
their facility LTC use. However, any bias resulting from unobservable changes in health status such 
as the hip fracture in the above example should be addressed by the use of IVs in this analysis. 
Finally, although ideally we would have been able to estimate the treatment effects on potentially 
avoidable readmissions,196 the small sample size and already reduced power due to the use of IVs 
prevented us from further limitations to the sample and outcomes. However, we believe our results on 
all-cause readmissions are still informative for policymakers and providers. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
In contrast to previous studies, we found that prior facility LTC residence may not 
independently increase risk of hospital readmission. This suggests that efforts to shift Medicaid 
budgets toward more proportional spending on community LTC (relative to facility LTC) may not 
impact readmission rates. However, LTC providers will remain important to the success of policy 
initiatives to reduce readmissions. Because they are part of both the LTC and the Medicare-covered 
sub-acute system and specifically targeted in new Medicare payment mechanisms (ACOs, bundles), 
facility LTC providers will be easier to influence through new Medicare incentives intended to reduce 
readmissions compared to the past. Important efforts at transparency will also enable the provider 
alignment necessary to meet these incentives. For example, efforts are underway to roll-out data 
sources that will make it easier for NFs and partnering providers to track NF readmissions, including 
the NF trade association’s trend tracker197 and CMS measures.198 Even if these efforts are focused 
on Medicare rehabilitation patients in SNF stays, there could be positive spillover effects for long-stay 
NF residents.  
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On the other hand, community LTC providers, given their diversity and decentralized nature, 
will be harder to influence through new Medicare payment mechanisms. Because they are often 
unpaid family caregivers or sometimes a collection of many paid and unpaid caregivers, hospitals and 
other healthcare providers may struggle to integrate community LTC providers into systems intended 
to decrease readmissions. Providers looking to coordinate with community LTC teams should look to 
programs such as PACE, which works cooperatively with community LTC providers to coordinate 
care. Additionally, providers should look to tools developed for care transitions199 or tools to reduce 
hospitalizations among similar patients in facility settings such as INTERACT,200,201 which could be 
adapted to train community LTC providers. Researchers should investigate those systems and areas 
that successfully reduce readmissions and understand how each LTC provider (community and 
facility LTC) cooperated with other healthcare providers, seeking to highlight those initiatives and 
programs that successfully reduce readmissions.  
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Table 6.1. 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Discharges by Previous Setting of LTC 
 
 
Mean (SD) or Percentage 
 
 
 
Mean (SD) or Percentage 
LTC Supply Interest 
 Community 
(N=1,793) 
Facility 
(N=455) 
 
Pre-disposing 
Characteristics  
Community 
(N=1,793) 
Facility 
(N=455) 
Number Children***  3.2 (2.3)  2.7 (2.2)  
 Age***  76.4 (10.3)  80 (9.5)  
Assisted Living 
Facilities 
 
1.1 (1.7)  1.1 (1.7)  
 Married***  47.3% 25.3% 
CCRCs  0.3 (0.6)  0.3 (0.6)       
State Spending 
Delivered Meals 
 
5.3 (2.4)  5.3 (2.4)  
 
Female 
 66.1% 69.9% 
State Medicaid NF Per 
Diem*** 
 
152.5 (36.1)  145.2 (33.2)  
 
African American  
 
13% 12.5% 
% Medicaid Spending 
on HCBS** 
 
25 (13.5)  23 (13.3)  
 
 
 
  
Potentially Enabling 
Characteristics  
Community 
(N=1,793) 
Facility 
(N=455)  Need Characteristics  
Community 
(N=1,793) 
Facility 
(N=455) 
Education*    Functional Limitation    
Less than High 
School 
46.8% 53.4%  Number of ADLs ***  2.6 (1.9)  2.1 (2)  
Some College 45.7% 38.2%  Cognitive Limitation  31.3% 31.4% 
College Graduate 7.5% 8.4%  Health Conditions   
Census Regions*    Alzheimers* 7% 10.5% 
New England  2.5% 2.2%  Hip Fracture 8.5% 9.5% 
Mid-Atlantic  15.8% 16.9%  Diabetes 38.3% 35.2% 
E. North Central  14.7% 18.7%  Cancer*** 20% 12.5% 
W. North Central  6.9% 11.4%  COPD/Emphysema*** 25.9% 18.5% 
South Atlantic  22.6% 20%  Stroke 26.9% 27% 
E. South Central  9.9% 7.7%  MI 24.8% 20.7% 
W. South Central  13.8% 11.4%  CHF** 11.9% 6.8% 
Mountain   5.4% 4.4%  Arteriosclerosis** 16.3% 11.2% 
Pacific  8.3% 7.3%  Arhythmia 16.3% 13.2% 
Rural    Angina** 17.5% 12.3% 
Urban 67.5% 71.4%  Hypertension** 68.3% 60.7% 
Large Town 18.3% 15.2%     
Rural 14.2% 13.4%     
Any Medicaid 
Eligibility 30.3% 28.1% 
 
 
  
West includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington; Mountain includes Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; West South Central includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; East South 
Central includes Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; West North Central includes Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; East North Central includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; 
South Atlantic includes Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, 
West Virginia; MidAtlantic includes New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; New England includes Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
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Figure 6.1. Facility LTC’s incremental effect on likelihood of 30-day readmission. 
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Figure 6.2. Facility LTC’s incremental effect on likelihood of 60-day readmission. 
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Figure 6.3. Likelihood of 30-day readmission if sample received facility LTC vs. community LTC. 
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research serves as a starting point to illuminate how LTC services affect healthcare 
service use. I expected to learn whether and how facility LTC, relative to community LTC, affects 
Medicare expenditures on specific types of services, as well as healthcare services that are avoidable 
and potentially wasteful for Medicare. A summary of the findings is presented in Table 7.1. The 
combined results from all three aims suggest that facility LTC has some effect on certain Medicare 
expenditures and service use. However, the findings only partially confirmed my hypotheses. My 
results suggest that incident facility LTC increases Medicare expenditures on sub-acute care as well 
as ED visits but does not affect expenditures on inpatient or physician services nor likelihood of 
readmission. This research is policy-actionable in its own right, as well as suggesting a range of 
follow-up research to better understand the relationships revealed in these studies. 
7.1. Summary of Findings 
I used an analytic dataset comprised of survey information and Medicare claims from the 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, zip code–level LTC supply information from the U.S. Census 
ZIP Code Business Patterns, data derived from the 2000–2009 State Program Reports providing 
state-level spending on home-delivered meals, and state-level Medicaid payment rates for NFs and 
percent of Medicaid spending on home and community-based services (HCBS) from the Brown 
University LTCFocus Web site. Across all three aims, I used number of adult children as an 
instrumental variable (IV) to predict setting of LTC. The use of the IV addressed the unobservable 
differences between similarly aged individuals who use facility LTC versus community LTC. Also 
across all three studies, I used largely the same sample of facility LTC and community LTC users, 
none of whom used facility LTC during a 3-month wash-out period and then received the respective 
treatment (facility or community LTC) during a one-year treatment period. I then modeled their 
Medicare expenditures or service use during a 21-month maximum outcome period.  
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Study 1 used survival-adjusted models to estimate facility LTC’s effect on Medicare 
expenditures for inpatient and physician services and found no significant total effect of facility LTC 
on expenditures for either type of service. However, incident facility LTC resulted in significantly lower 
survival compared to community LTC. Higher mortality significantly lowered expenditures on both 
types of services across the outcome period (though not enough to affect total expenditures). The IV 
and non-IV models did not differ for the survival results, suggesting that unobservable characteristics 
had little effect on mortality rates; however, the point estimates for the IV and non-IV models differed 
for estimates of the effect on service intensity and the total effect, suggesting that unobservable 
characteristics may affect how much and what types of services individuals used when alive. 
Study 2 also used a survival-adjusted model to estimate facility LTC’s effect on Medicare 
expenditures on sub-acute care (SNF, home health, and hospice). Given the identical sample, the 
findings on survival were the same as Study 1, with facility LTC having a significant effect on 
mortality. Again, similar to Study 1, increased mortality decreased expenditures on sub-acute care 
over the outcome period. However, facility LTC significantly increased sub-acute service intensity 
over the outcome period (an increase of $2,833 by month 21). These two effects (lower survival rates 
decreasing the average costs while increased service intensity over survived time increasing average 
costs) initially increased sub-acute expenditures; however, these countervailing effects resulted in a 
non-significant total marginal effect in later periods. The IV and non-IV models differed in the 
estimates of effects due to service intensity and total effects, suggesting again that unobservable 
characteristics may affect service use when alive. 
Study 3 estimated facility LTC’s effect on specific types of potentially avoidable healthcare 
services: ED visits, hospital observation days, and 30-day and 60-day hospital readmissions. First, 
after estimating facility LTC’s effect on ED visits using a survival-adjusted model, I found that facility 
LTC significantly increased the number of ED visits over the outcome period. Again, lower survival 
among those who use facility LTC decreased the number of ED visits, but facility LTC increased the 
intensity of ED service use over time survived. This resulted in a positive and significant total 
differential effect on the number of ED visits over the outcome period (.1295 increase in the 
cumulative counts of ED visits by period 16); the effect became non-significant late in the outcome 
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period. Similar to Study 2, the effects due to service intensity and total effects differed for the IV and 
non-IV models. I attempted to model observation days using a survival-adjusted model, but after 
constructing the sample I discovered that I had too few observation days within the sample to model 
observation days. Finally, I estimated facility LTC’s effect on likelihood of 30-day and 60-day 
readmissions. I constructed a sample of discharges for all eligible treated and control individuals. I 
modeled likelihood of both readmission and a composite outcome (readmission or death) within 30 or 
60 days. I found no significant effect of facility LTC on either likelihood of readmission or likelihood of 
readmission or death for 30 or 60 days. These non-significant effects were true for both the IV and 
non-IV models. 
7.2.  Implications for Policy and Practice 
Some of the highest cost and most vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries receive LTC in 
facilities. LTC facilities face multiple financial incentives to increase residents’ healthcare service use. 
However, because individuals who receive facility LTC are likely more sick, on average, than other 
beneficiaries, research to date has struggled to identify any independent effect of facility LTC on 
Medicare expenditures. As a result, policymakers and practitioners have not known whether facility 
LTC increases Medicare expenditures.  
This study provides evidence that LTC setting has an impact on Medicare spending and 
service use for some beneficiaries, though this impact appears to be concentrated in certain 
segments of service. Amidst the ongoing conversation about the role of payment and incentives in 
reducing healthcare costs, this research suggests that policymakers should tailor efforts to target 
certain types of healthcare, particularly sub-acute care and ED vists, among those who use LTC.  
The finding that incident facility LTC decreased survival over the outcome period is 
concerning and warrants further investigation. First, additional research should work to validate the 
relationship found here and, with a larger sample size, investigate whether these effects differ by sub-
groups. New datasets such as the National Health and Aging Trends Study could be useful for such a 
validation study. Next, research should illuminate possible causal pathways, including the act of 
moving residence in a frail, older population; potential increased exposure to potentially life-
threatening conditions (falls, infections, etc); facility LTC practice patterns in the treatment of possibly 
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mortal risks; facility LTC’s effect on residents’ mental health, which could contribute to decline; and 
the risks of increased number of transfers to hospitals or other facilities once someone lives in a LTC 
facility. Additionally, research should examine whether increasing transparency on the quality of LTC 
facilities alters the mortality rates seen here. 
Our non-significant findings on acute and physician expenditures suggest that all LTC 
providers have an opportunity to decrease healthcare costs. We failed to confirm our hypothesis that 
facility LTC increased spending on inpatient services. Despite incentives for facility LTC providers to 
increase utilization of inpatient services, community LTC users did not have relatively lower spending 
on inpatient care, which may reflect the challenges of providing community LTC. Community LTC 
providers are often decentralized and face little incentive to integrate with healthcare providers. 
Although the lack of incentive to increase healthcare use prevents waste, there are also no incentives 
to decrease healthcare service use for community LTC providers. In these cases, community LTC’s 
decentralized nature may present a challenge to offering such incentives. Future payment 
mechanisms, such as ACOs, may struggle to integrate the array of formal and informal community 
LTC providers into their systems. However, because most individuals receive community LTC, new 
and creative ways to incorporate these providers will be critical to successful cost reduction in the 
older disabled population.  
The findings supported our hypothesis that facility LTC increases spending on certain sub-
acute services, including SNF, home health, and hospice. These findings have several implications 
for ongoing policy efforts. First, facility LTC users may be ideal candidates for cost reduction efforts 
through the post–acute care bundling demonstrations. However, current segmentation of NFs toward 
either primarily post-acute rehabilitative care or custodial LTC may be augmented through payment 
bundling, because hospitals will be incentivized to concentrate their discharges in SNFs that excel at 
providing post-acute care. At the same time, facility LTC residents may want to receive SNF care in 
their original facility, regardless of the facilities’ expertise in rehabilitation. If so, these high-cost post-
acute users may live in and receive post-acute care in LTC facilities that are less influenced by the 
bundling demonstrations. This may limit the bundling demonstration’s effectiveness in cost reduction 
among the facility LTC population. Second, policymakers should consider Medicare benefit design 
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that incentivizes facility LTC providers to push for the most appropriate type of sub-acute care at the 
lowest cost. For example, proposals to redesign hospice for facility LTC recipients such that it 
includes post-acute rehabilitation, hospice, and facility LTC payment might achieve this end.202 
Finally, efforts to divert limited Medicaid LTC budgets toward community LTC in lieu of NF care 
should be informed by the potential Medicare cost implications of these efforts. If indeed Medicare 
could realize positive externalities by advocating for Medicaid LTC re-balancing, these efforts may 
continue to receive attention from CMS. 
Our findings on potentially preventable health services use have several implications. First, 
the increase in the number of ED visits among facility LTC residents is an important area for future 
policy development. Creating incentives for NFs to limit ED use and transparent reporting and 
tracking mechanisms for NF use of EDs would both be useful. Payment policies that incentivize 
physicians to increase engagement with LTC facilities may help with this issue. However, to the 
extent that ED use is driven by liability concerns or other systemic issues, ED visits may be difficult to 
influence through incentives or reporting. Second, our finding that facility LTC did not affect likelihood 
of later hospital readmission suggests that efforts to reduce readmissions will need to integrate both 
types of LTC providers into future delivery system reforms. Given the decentralized nature of 
community LTC providers, hospitals and other coordinators of post-discharge care will need to work 
creatively to involve these LTC providers. 
7.3.  Next Steps and Future Research 
An immediate follow-up study might revisit the sample and analysis plan used here and 
estimate total Medicare expenditures over the outcome period. This would help illuminate how the 
findings on different types of services, which are more policy-actionable, could affect total Medicare 
spending. Given our survival findings, another immediate follow-up study would be to revisit this 
research in a different sample of individuals, particularly to investigate the relationship of incident 
facility LTC on survival. The new National Health and Aging Trends Study is a potential dataset for 
this analysis. If this relationship is validated, mixed methods investigation into possible reasons for 
the survival effect (including investigations into care transitions in facility LTC, management or 
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treatment of risks such as falls or infections, and the mental health of facility versus community LTC 
recipients) and their associations with mortality risks could help explain our findings. 
Future research could include a deeper investigation into the role of LTC providers in end-of-
life health care. For example, two possible studies include a study looking at whether LTC setting 
affects end-of-life expenditures, looking retrospectively from death, and a study identifying how, within 
facility LTC settings, quality of LTC settings may affect health services use during end-of-life.  
A nice complement to these studies would be to investigate the extent to which healthcare 
service use exhibited here differs from LTC users’ patterns of healthcare use in capitated systems. 
For example, Evercare is a managed care organization that focuses on nursing facility residents. 
Evidence comparing NF service use in capitated and non-capitated systems could inform the role of 
LTC in new capitated payments, including Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). If disabled older 
adults are the highest cost beneficiaries across payer and payment types, more research into how 
they use health care within capitated systems will be helpful to ACOs.  
Finally, the results presented here could compel qualitative or mixed methods research to 
determine the role of financial incentives in how LTC facilities and LTC facility residents choose 
health services, such as choices for sub-acute care. This evidence could help inform the relationship 
of clinical and financial decision-making in the healthcare use of LTC facility residents. 
7.4.  Conclusion 
Some of the highest cost and most vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries receive LTC in 
facilities. LTC facilities face multiple financial incentives to increase residents’ healthcare service use. 
This dissertation found that incident use of facility LTC, relative to community LTC, decreased 
survival over a 21-month outcome period. The studies found that incident facility LTC increased 
certain types of Medicare expenditures and service use, including sub-acute care and ED visits, but 
did not increase expenditures on inpatient or physician/practitioner servicers or likelihood of hospital 
re-admission. This evidence suggests LTC facilities do have influence on residents’ healthcare use. 
Payment and benefit redesign should seek to reward the integration of LTC and healthcare delivery 
into more appropriate and efficient use of Medicare-covered services for vulnerable older adults. 
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Table 7.1. 
Summary of Findings 
Facility LTC’s effect on  Due to Survival Differences 
Due to Service 
Intensity Total Effect 
Inpatient Expenditures significant decrease non-significant* non-significant* 
Physician/Practitioner Expenditures significant decrease non-significant* non-significant* 
SNF, Home Health, & Hospice 
Expenditures significant decrease 
significant 
increase* 
significant 
increase* 
ED Visits significant decrease significant increase* 
significant 
increase* 
Readmissions n/a n/a non-significant 
*Point estimates substantially different in IV and non-IV models 
 
 
 
 Implementation of 2SRI 
In the most common version of the 2SRI, the residual is taken as the difference between 
predicted likelihood of treatment P(xb) and the true value of treatment (0/1) or 
(See Figure A.1). 
Figure A.1. Predicted likelihood of 
 
 
 
However, this approach does not incorporate all the available information we have about 
these unobservables. Because we know the true treatment, we also know that the true value of the 
likely treatment (P(xb)) is closer to 1 or 0. That means that the true value of the unobservables 
affecting treatment are also likely closer to 0 or 1 than this difference represented above.
Thus, the better estimate of 
residual is somewhere between the predicted treatment and true treatment. Because we know the 
lower bounds of the residual (the expected value of treatment), the inverse Mills ratio (in the large 
fraction term below) helps provide such an estimate, where fo
variance σ2  
The inverse Mills ratio is likely the best representation of the residual.
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 is likely one that conditions on the knowledge that the 
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However, because it is a transformation of the P(xb), we had problems with collinearity in the 
second stage with the difference in true treatment and the probability of treatment P(t) being collinear 
with other covariates. Thus, we simulated a value of   > given the true value of treatment (similar to 
but not the same as the inverse Mills ratio). We generated a distribution of possible   > values 
conditional on what is observed in the first stage. 
The major advantage of this approach is that it allowed us to include a residual term but 
eliminated problems with collinearity. The major disadvantage of this approach is that it is really  > + 
F (the simulated piece) and thus is a noisy estimate of   >. Measurement error tends to bias 
coefficients on the residual toward zero and create risk of finding no effect or a smaller effect when 
there is an effect or larger effect. This could cause tests of endogeneity (such as the test of the 
significant of the residual term in the second stage) to fail to reject exogeneity when, in fact, 
endogeneity is present.  
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APPENDIX 2 
In the most common version of the 2SRI, the residual is calculated by subtracting the 
predicted likelihood of treatment P(xb) and the true value of treatment (0/1), or   > = y (  y T. 
This value is inserted directly into second-stage equations. However, because we know the true 
treatment, we also know that the true value of the probability of treatment (P(xb)) is closer to 0 or 1. 
As a result, the true value of the unobservables affecting treatment are also likely closer to 0 or 1. A 
perhaps better estimate of   ε> is one that conditions on this knowledge that the residual is 
somewhere between the predicted treatment and true treatment.  
Because we know the lower bounds of the residual (the expected value of treatment), the 
inverse Mills ratio (in the large fraction term below) helps provide such an estimate, where for a 
random variable X with mean µ and variance σ2 
z{| | }~       8} (  91 (  8} (  9           z{|  }~     
( 8} (  9 8} (  9  
The inverse Mills ratio is likely the best representation of the residual. However, because it is a 
transformation of the P(xb), we had problems with collinearity in the second stage with the difference 
in true treatment and the probability of treatment P(t) being collinear with other covariates. Thus, we 
simulated a value of   > given the true value of treatment (similar to but not the same as the inverse 
Mills ratio). We generated a distribution of possible   > values conditional on what is observed in the 
first stage. The major advantage of this approach is that it allowed us to include a residual term but 
eliminates problems with collinearity. The major drawback of this approach is that it is really   >  F 
(the simulated piece) and thus is a noisy estimate of   >. Measurement error tends to bias coefficients 
on the residual toward 0 and create risk of finding no effect or a smaller effect when there is an effect 
or larger effect. This could cause tests of endogeneity (such as the test of the significant of the 
residual term in the second stage) to fail to reject exogeneity when, in fact, endogeneity is present. 
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